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Pengantar Redaksi

Dinamika hubungan internasional kontemporer semakin ditandai oleh kompleksitas interaksi antara kepentingan ekonomi, politik, dan keamanan di tengah perubahan tatanan global yang cepat. Pergeseran menuju dunia multipolar, meningkatnya rivalitas kekuatan besar, serta munculnya isu-isu lintas batas seperti perubahan iklim, konflik identitas, dan kejahatan transnasional menuntut analisis yang lebih komprehensif dan multidisipliner.

Dalam konteks tersebut, Paramadina Journal of Diplomacy & Foreign Policy Volume 02 Nomor 01 Tahun 2026 menghadirkan beragam kajian yang merefleksikan dinamika tersebut, mulai dari analisis geoekonomi hubungan Indonesia–Pakistan, peran ASEAN dalam isu kemanusiaan di Myanmar, hingga isu diplomasi iklim, Reartikulasi Identitas Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia dalam Diskursus Presiden Prabowo Subianto tentang Gaza (2024-2025), dan wacana ideologi transnasional. Keseluruhan artikel dalam edisi ini memperlihatkan bagaimana aktor negara dan non-negara merespons tantangan global melalui strategi yang semakin adaptif dan berbasis kepentingan.

Lebih jauh, edisi ini juga menegaskan pentingnya pendekatan interdisipliner dalam memahami hubungan internasional, di mana dimensi ekonomi, identitas, lingkungan, dan teknologi saling berkelindan membentuk konfigurasi kekuatan global yang baru. Dalam lanskap yang semakin cair ini, negara-negara dituntut tidak hanya mengandalkan kekuatan tradisional, tetapi juga mengoptimalkan instrumen diplomasi inovatif dan kolaborasi lintas kawasan untuk mempertahankan relevansi dan daya saingnya.

Kami berharap edisi ini tidak hanya memperkaya khazanah akademik di bidang diplomasi dan politik luar negeri, tetapi juga memberikan kontribusi substantif bagi pengembangan kebijakan dan diskursus publik yang lebih kritis dan konstruktif.

Redaksi

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Indonesia–Pakistan Relations: A Geoeconomic Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Indonesia and Pakistan, two of the world's largest Muslim-majority countries, have maintained cordial relations shaped by anti-colonial solidarity, shared Islamic values, and post-independence diplomatic ties established in 1950. In the context of an evolving Indo-Pacific order marked by intensifying great-power competition, this study examines the following questions: How have Indonesia–Pakistan relations evolved since 2020 in terms of economic and strategic engagement? What economic opportunities and strategic constraints shape their cooperation within the ASEAN framework? Grounded in a geo-economic analytical framework, the article argues that contemporary Indonesia–Pakistan relations are increasingly pragmatic and interest-driven amid regional geopolitical shifts such as United States–China rivalry. The findings reveal that Indonesia, as ASEAN's key member, offers Pakistan pathways for market access and regional economic integration, while bilateral ties have been strengthened through high-level visits, preferential trade agreements, and defense cooperation. Nonetheless, these relations face constraints, including trade imbalances, domestic political vulnerabilities, and external pressures stemming from great-power competition. The study concludes that Pakistan could benefit from emulating India's multi-alignment strategy by balancing relations with Jakarta, Washington, and Beijing to mitigate overdependence on traditional partners and to capitalize on geoeconomic opportunities in a multipolar Asia.

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1. Introduction

Pakistan is geoeconomically located in a crucial part of Asia. Its foreign policy has traditionally been based on the alliances with the United States (US), China and the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, in the context of emerging multipolarity, Pakistan has sought diversification in its foreign policy in terms of developing stronger relations with Southeast Asian countries especially including Indonesia—the largest Muslim-majority country in the world

demographically and a key actor in the ASEAN (Esti, 2026). This trend is also reflective of wider changes in the international system as the emerging economies are finding cooperative relations to reduce dependencies and increase their resilience (Khaliq, 2024).

Indonesia, having an archipelagic territory between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is at the center of the Indo-Pacific, affecting maritime trade routes and security of the region (He, 2008; Hadiwinata, 2009). It is pursuing an active foreign policy in the post-Suharto period, which is

hinged on economic diplomacy and non-alignment. Indonesia's relations with Pakistan date back to the pre-partition period where the Indian Muslims supported the former's anti-Dutch fight in the 1940s (Fiaz, 2014). When Pakistan became a sovereign state in 1947, it established formal ties with Indonesia in 1950. The Bandung Conference of 1955, advocated decolonization and unity of the Third World, further enhanced bilateral relations (Gindarsah, 2012).

This study examines the contemporary dynamics of Indonesia-Pakistan relations within this historical background. Specifically, we will examine two significant questions: how have Indonesia-Pakistan relations developed since 2020 regarding economic and strategic engagement? What structural opportunities and strategic restrictions influence their collaboration inside the ASEAN framework? These questions are addressed in light of geoeconomic perspective that emphasize economic instruments in achieving strategic goals (Luttwak, 1990; Csurgai, 2018).

Importantly, Indonesia-Pakistan bilateral relations have progressed positively since 2020, influenced by global disruptions such as COVID-19 and geopolitical shifts within the Asian region. For example, in 2024, trade between Indonesia and Pakistan surged to USD 4.2 billion, predominantly driven by Indonesian palm oil exports, while preferential trade agreements such as the 2013 Indonesia-Pakistan PTA (IP-PTA) have been progressively upgraded toward a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), anticipated by 2027 (Esti, 2026; Khan, 2026). High-level diplomatic engagements, including Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto's visit to Islamabad in December 2025, resulted in memoranda of understanding (MoUs) across education, health, and defense sectors (Sharif, 2025; Subianto, 2025). Strategically, discussions concerning JF-17 fighter jets and unmanned aerial vehicles indicate an expansion of bilateral military cooperation (Sjamsoeddin & Sidhu, 2026; Haraj, 2026).

Nevertheless, these opportunities are tempered by structural constraints. Within ASEAN, Pakistan's status as a Sectoral Dialogue Partner (SDP) since 1993 provides market access but precludes full integration due to economic asymmetries and broader geopolitical considerations (Wilkins, 2023; Koga, 2023). Intensifying great-power competition, particularly between the US

and China, further complicates the bilateral relationship. Domestically, Pakistan's economic vulnerabilities and Indonesia's evolving bio-diesel policies pose additional risks to sustainable engagement (Glosserman, 2023; Boon, 2023). This recalibration underscores Pakistan's imperative to diversify its economic opportunities, while Indonesia seeks to expand access to South Asian markets in pursuit of its G20 economic ambitions (Quilop, 2023; Pongsudhirak, 2023). Leveraging geo-economic tools can facilitate mutual gains, as shall be analyzed later in details. However, bureaucratic and institutional hurdles remain salient (Thompson, 2023; Eun, 2022).

Last but not least, before addressing the proposed research questions, it is pertinent to review key studies on Indonesia-Pakistan relations. The underlying aim is to identify missing links in the literature and determine the scope for this study to contribute, both theoretically and empirically, to existing scholarship by analyzing the evolving geoeconomic and strategic dimensions of bilateral cooperation.

2. Survey of Key Studies

The literature on Indonesia-Pakistan relations, spanning historical, political, and economic dimensions, provides a foundational understanding of their bilateral ties, though it remains relatively sparse compared to studies on larger regional dynamics. Early works trace the roots to anti-colonial solidarity, with Anwar (1994) detailing pre-independence support from Indian Muslims for Indonesia's independence struggle, framing it as a precursor to formal diplomatic relations in 1950. Similarly, Fiaz (2014) analyzed the ideological affinities during the Bandung Conference, arguing that shared non-aligned principles fostered early cooperation amid Cold War bipolarity (Anwar, 1994; Fiaz, 2014).

Importantly, the studies produced in the Post-Cold War period highlight shifts toward pragmatic engagement. For example, Hadiwinata (2009) examined Indonesia's democratization post-1998, comparing it with Pakistan's military-dominated politics, positing that divergent governance models limited deeper ties between the two sides despite religious affinities. Khaliq (2024) builds on this by analyzing state-religion

relations, observing how Islamic identity has facilitated the intra-Muslim world collaboration especially through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). However, this constrained secular foreign policy pursuits cross-regionally (Hadiwinata, 2009; Khaliq, 2024). From a Pakistani perspective, Rizvi (1993), in particular, highlighted Islamabad's efforts to balance relations with Jakarta amid U.S.–Soviet rivalries, while Zaidi and Saud (2021) emphasize post-9/11 counterterrorism cooperation, including joint military exercises (Rizvi, 1993; Zaidi & Saud, 2021).

Moreover, while referring to the ASEAN framework of mutual cooperation, some studies have underscored trade and investment opportunities while also indicating various barriers. For example, Thompson (2023) argued that Pakistan's sectoral dialogue partner (SDP) status offers institutional pathways but the former's economic weaknesses delay its full dialogue partner (FDP) prospects. In addition, Pongsudhirak (2023) also investigated great power competition and growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region (Thompson, 2023; Pongsudhirak, 2023). Besides, domestic constraints are analyzed by Glosserman (2023), who links Pakistan's fiscal stress to its persistent trade imbalances, and by Boon (2023), who analyzes how Indonesia's biodiesel policies have shaped its export outcomes (Glosserman, 2023; Boon, 2023).

Besides, comparative analyses have provided broader insights on the subject. Xue (2023), for instance, compared Indonesia–Pakistan relations with India–ASEAN ties, indicating multi-alignment strategies for Islamabad. Quilop (2023) also focused on the untapped potential in halal trade and agritech (Xue, 2023; Quilop, 2023). Nonetheless, the literature underemphasizes post-2020 geopolitical shifts such as US–China trade war and its repercussions for bilateral energy and defense cooperation. This study addresses this gap through a geo-economic lens, while analyzing empirical data on trade trends and Indonesia–Pakistan recent trade agreements amid regional realignments (Eun, 2022; Rüländ, 2018).

Last but not least, despite the analytical contributions of the above-mentioned accounts, there are several limitations in the literature on Indonesia–Pakistan relations. First, the literature remains relatively sparse and fragmented and has largely leaned toward historical and

ideological affinities, rather than engaging with contemporary geoeconomic processes. Resultantly, there is a noticeable gap in analyses of post-2020 developments, particularly in relation to US–China competition (Khaliq, 2024). Second, most studies adopt a bilateral perspective without sufficiently incorporating regional institutions such as ASEAN, thereby demoting the role of institutional constraints and economic opportunities for multilateral engagement (Thompson, 2023; Pongsudhirak, 2023). Third, comparative analyses largely remain confined to India–ASEAN relations and did not offer insight into how Pakistan might pursue multi-alignment strategies within a multipolar Asia (Xue, 2023; Quilop, 2023). Lastly, empirical data on trade imbalances and defense cooperation are often outdated, hence underscoring the need for more rigorous and theory-guided empirical analysis as this study conducts in the following (Eun, 2022).

3. Theoretical Framework

To begin with, non-rationalist theories such as social constructivism are primarily concerned with understanding power relations in terms of ideas, identities, and socially constructed discourses that shape the worldview of actors, whether states or corporations (Wendt, 2012). This contrasts with mainstream IR theories, which place central emphasis on rational states and their role in managing geopolitics (Waltz, 1979). While these theoretical approaches have informed the existing literature reviewed above, the present study adopts a geoeconomic framework to analyze Indonesia–Pakistan economic cooperation within the contemporary international environment.

According to Edward Luttwak (1990), geoeconomics refers to the use of economic tools, tactics, and policies to accomplish geopolitical goals or to influence the behavior of other actors at the international level. It entails the use and manipulation of economic power, including trade, investment, sanctions, tariffs, and other economic instruments, with the objective of achieving geopolitical benefits and strategic advantages. In other words, the geoeconomic approach serves as a prism through which states are viewed not merely as military entities but as multifaceted economic actors oriented toward

securing economic gains, technological development, and the well-being of their citizens. Although this shift does not render military power irrelevant, it underscores the growing significance of economic instruments in state behavior and international relations since the end of World War II (Luttwak, 1990; Csurgai, 2018).

Gyula Csurgai (2018) offered another important contribution by analyzing the evolving role of geoeconomics in global politics, with particular focus on the increasing prominence of non-market forces. Similarly, Antto Vihma (2018) investigated the concept of geoeconomics in international relations and emphasized its re-emergence as a central force underpinning the relationship between commerce and political strategy. Importantly, Vihma provides a more nuanced extension of Luttwak's original argument by highlighting the expanding role of economic resources in international affairs and examining how domestic politics and ideology influence the geoeconomic policies of various countries. The literature also critiques constructivist interpretations and reflects broader shifts in international relations scholarship toward mid-level theories that move beyond rigid paradigm debates (Vihma, 2018; Scholvin & Wigell, 2018). In this regard, Søren Scholvin and Mikael Wigell (2018) further conceptualize geoeconomics as both a foreign policy approach and an analytical framework for understanding state behavior.

In view of the foregoing, it can be posited that the geoeconomic perspective offers a useful analytical lens for analyzing how economic instruments are deployed to achieve economic and strategic goals amid the complexities of contemporary international relations. In this context, Pakistan's first-ever National Security Policy (2022–2026) represents a significant shift in the country's security paradigm, placing economic security at its core. The policy emphasizes both traditional and non-traditional dimensions of security, including health, education, and climate resilience.

In addition, the said policy underscores national integration, economic security, and territorial integrity within an increasingly assertive foreign policy framework (National Security Division, 2022; Luttwak, 1990). This orientation is also relevant to Indonesia–Pakistan relations, which are increasingly shaped by mutual intentions to expand commercial and defense

cooperation in the contemporary strategic environment. From this perspective, the geo-economic framework possesses strong explanatory capacity and, as elaborated later in this article, can be employed to theoretically assess the empirical realities of bilateral cooperation in trade, defense projects, and prospective investment. These areas represent key economic instruments through which both countries seek enhanced market connectivity within an evolving geopolitical landscape, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region (Csurgai, 2018; Vihma, 2018).

4. Indonesia–Pakistan Geoeconomic Cooperation

Indonesia–Pakistan relations have historically been friendly, but since 2020, bilateral ties have strengthened as both countries seek to leverage economic instruments to achieve strategic advantages. Using the geoeconomic framework—a perspective that views trade, investment, and sectoral agreements as tools of geopolitical strategy—recent trends in trade, defense cooperation, and high-level official visits are examined in the following sub-sections as means of advancing national interests in a competitive Indo-Pacific region (Luttwak, 1990; Csurgai, 2018).

Trade

Geoeconomic pragmatism to diversify partnerships has led to a rapid increase in bilateral trade since 2020. Confined to USD 2.6 billion in 2020, the volumes then climbed to USD 4.2 billion in 2024, with January–September volumes of USD 2.92 billion in the first three quarters of 2025 (Esti, 2026; Pudji, 2025). Indonesia dominates palm oil exports (USD 2.77 billion in 2024), while Pakistan is also a palm oil producer as well as a textile and rice exporter, which creates a long-term trade deficit for Islamabad (Budi, 2025). This disequilibrium highlights Pakistan's energy-dependent economy, which seeks cheaper imports, consistent with the geoeconomic aim of reducing reliance on Gulf suppliers (Kamal, 2026; Sharif, 2025).

The 2013 IP-PTA is central to this, as it has doubled trade since its enactment, with recent changes in 2019 allowing zero-tariff access for Pakistan on 20 lines (Dyah, 2026; Esti, 2026).

After 2020, both countries advocated expanding it to a CEPA by 2027, including services and investment, to overcome barriers such as freight costs and non-tariff measures (Jam, 2026; Dyah, 2026). Geoeconomically, this framework is useful for Indonesia to achieve export diversification and for Pakistan to access markets amid increasing economic instability (Vihma, 2018; Scholvin & Wigell, 2018).

Recent statistics for 2025 indicate that bilateral trade has exceeded USD 3.6 billion, with Indonesian exports accounting for most of this total between January and November, generating a surplus of USD 3.2 billion for Jakarta (Esti, 2026; Budi, 2025). In response, the two countries signed an MoU in January 2026 to establish a Joint Trade Committee (JTC), which aims to reduce imbalances and facilitate dialogue on non-tariff barriers (Kamal, 2026; Putri, 2026). This formal committee highlights sectors such as halal products, agriculture, and IT, where Pakistan's exports of rice and mangoes can gain momentum (Putri, 2026; Kamal, 2026). Moreover, the operationalization of the D-8 PTA by Indonesia since January 2025 has been positively received by Pakistan, with plans to expand it into a CEPA during Indonesia's D-8 chairmanship in 2026–2027 (Esti, 2026; Sharif, 2025).

Geoeconomically, these measures allow Pakistan to mitigate vulnerabilities from global supply chain disruptions, such as those in 2022–2023, by securing stable palm oil imports critical for its food and biodiesel industries (Vihma, 2018). Indonesia, meanwhile, uses trade surpluses to fund infrastructure investments, reinforcing its role as ASEAN's economic anchor (Csurgai, 2018; Scholvin & Wigell, 2018).

Table 1 illustrates bilateral trade trends:

Year	Total Trade (US\$ Billion)	Indonesia Exports to Pakistan	Pakistan Exports to Indonesia	Trade Balance for Pakistan
2020	2.6	2.3	0.3	-2.0
2021	3.1	2.7	0.4	-2.3
2022	3.5	3.0	0.5	-2.5
2023	3.8	3.2	0.6	-2.6
2024	4.2	3.6	0.6	-3.0
2025 (Jan-Nov)	3.6	3.2	0.4	-2.8

(Source: Pudji, 2025; OEC, 2025; Putri, 2026)

High-Level Visits

Since 2020, high-level interactions have enabled collaboration, which constitutes geo-economic diplomacy. The groundwork was laid during President Widodo's visit in 2018, but momentum accelerated in December 2025 when Prabowo visited, and seven MoUs were signed in education, health, and trade (Subianto, 2025; Sharif, 2025). Earlier, the 2026 meeting of Defense Minister Sjamsoeddin facilitated discussions on JF-17 fighter jets (Sjamsoeddin & Sidhu, 2026; Haraj, 2026). Such visits were accompanied by Pakistani delegations, emphasizing the creation of trust amid domestic challenges.

In January 2026, Indonesian Vice Minister of Trade Putri visited Islamabad to sign the 8th PEOC, resulting in the JTC MoU and a renewal of CEPA ambitions (Putri, 2026; Kamal, 2026). This followed Prabowo's historic visit in December 2025, the first in seven years, during which leaders pledged to strengthen ties by investing in CPEC-related projects (Subianto, 2025; Shehbaz, 2025). Such diplomacy, conducted under the pressure of great powers, is geo-economic in nature, and Indonesia's non-alignment complements Pakistan's diversification strategy (Csurgai, 2018; Scholvin & Wigell, 2018).

Sectoral Agreements

Geoeconomic synergies are evident in sectoral pacts, particularly in the defense and energy sectors. The 2010 defense agreement evolved into discussions on 40 JF-17 jets and drones in 2025–2026, involving multi-billion-dollar deals, which enhanced Indonesia's air capabilities and increased Pakistan's exports (Sjamsoeddin & Sidhu, 2026; Haraj, 2026). Energy relations focus on palm oil, with Indonesia guaranteeing stable supplies regardless of biodiesel demand (Pudji, 2025; Budi, 2025).

Building on Prabowo's visit, agreements were made on halal certification and agriculture to expand Pakistan's market for Indonesian processed foods, while joint ventures in IT and renewable energy were proposed (Shehbaz, 2025; Putri, 2026). These agreements help cushion Pakistan's economic insecurities through economic measures aimed at strategic resilience (Luttwak, 1990). Additionally, discussions on CPEC integration may coordinate Indonesia's

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments with Pakistan's corridors to enhance regional connectivity (Kamal, 2026; Esti, 2026).

Besides, in agriculture, a recently signed MoU focuses on collaborating on rice farms, leveraging Pakistan's expertise to improve Indonesian production in response to climate challenges (Sharif, 2025). Geo-economically, these initiatives extend beyond trade to technology transfer, aligning with the diversification policies of both countries (Vihma, 2018; Scholvin & Wigell, 2018).

5. Economic Opportunities and Strategic Constraints

Within the ASEAN, Indonesia–Pakistan cooperation offers economic opportunities via institutional pathways, yet faces strategic constraints from trade architecture, great power competition, and domestic factors (Wilkins, 2023). In this section, we analyze the opportunities and constraints in Indonesia–Pakistan cooperation.

Opportunities through ASEAN

To begin with, the SDP situation in Pakistan since 1993 offers such avenues as the AP-JSCC to conduct a trade and investment dialogue (ASEAN Secretariat, 2025; Thompson, 2023). This is enabled by Indonesia which leads the ASEAN, and the 2024–2028 PCA focuses on practical cooperation (ASEAN Secretariat, 2025). The opportunities encompass market access to the 3.3 trillion economy of ASEAN that might be accessible through FTAs (Pongsudhirak, 2023; Xue, 2023).

Nevertheless, progress is constrained by Pakistan's pending FDP bid due to limited economic strength and geopolitical concerns (Wilkins, 2023). During the 2025 ASEAN chairmanship of Malaysia, support was provided, but no breakthrough was achieved because of institutional barriers, such as the requirement for consensus. In February 2025, the 8th AP-JSCC renewed bilateral relations, with a particular focus on the digital economy and renewable energy; however, progress has been slow as Pakistan remains unable to fully implement the initiatives (ASEAN Secretariat, 2025; Quilop, 2023).

Prospects in Regional Trade

The trade systems found in ASEAN, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), have significant integration potential for Pakistan; however, due to its non-member status, it must rely on bilateral relationships with Indonesia (Khaliq, 2024). The IP-PTA, enacted in 2013 and revised in 2019, has provided zero-tariff access for key Pakistani exports such as textiles and rice, resulting in trade volumes increasing from USD 2.6 billion in 2020 to over USD 3.6 billion by November 2025 (Esti, 2026; OEC, 2025). Nevertheless, ongoing imbalances—whereby Indonesian exports generated a USD 3.2 billion surplus by 2025—persist due to high logistics costs, non-tariff barriers, and competition in overlapping sectors such as agriculture (Putri, 2026). These arrangements allow Pakistan to diversify beyond traditional partners by leveraging Indonesia's ASEAN leadership to enter the market indirectly, though further connectivity programs, such as CPEC integration, are needed to reduce dependence on freight (Scholvin & Wigell, 2018; Vihma, 2018).

Attempts to establish a free trade agreement (FTA) between ASEAN and Pakistan have faced opposition due to tariff differences, as ASEAN employs lower average tariffs than Pakistan (which maintains an average of 13.9 percent), increasing competition in the textile and halal product markets (Pongsudhirak, 2023). These challenges are being addressed through the operationalization of the D-8 PTA in 2025 and CEPA expansion plans in 2027, which aim to include services and investments to boost Pakistan's exports in IT and agritech (Esti, 2026; Sharif, 2025). However, socioeconomic limitations remain, as ASEAN prioritizes intra-bloc stability and resilience to external shocks, and external integration is constrained until Pakistan demonstrates economic stability and compliance with requirements, such as palm oil sustainability (Csurgai, 2018). This underscores the need for specific reforms to align Pakistan with the ASEAN trade architecture for mutual benefit.

Great Power Competition

In the Indo-Pacific, strategic possibilities are constrained by US–China rivalry, wherein Indonesia pursues a balancing approach, while Pakistan's alignment through CPEC has exposed it to potential risks of American sanctions

(Thompson, 2023; Pongsudhirak, 2023). This also impacts the defense deals such as JF-17, which gained primacy in the context of India-Pakistan limited war, fought in May 2025 (Haraj, 2026; Sjamsoeddin and Sidhu, 2026). The same year, the US monitored the JF-17 suggested to Indonesia by Pakistan, which also raised the issue of technology transfer, which may trigger CAATSA. Moreover, the BRI investment in the two countries by China creates synergies yet generates concerns of debt traps, thus, making it difficult to adopt a neutral position (Haraj, 2026; Acharya, 2025).

Contrary to ASEAN, however, great power competition provide Indonesia-Pakistan with prospects of cooperation by taking advantage of multilateral forums to balance the US-China rivalry. For example, the non-alignment of Indonesia in ASEAN enables Pakistan to participate in such forums as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) where Indo-Pacific strategies that exclude alliances such as the Quad can be advocated (Acharya, 2025). As an example, joint involvement in ARF deliberations about maritime security may allow the implementation of common actions regarding counterterrorism and response to disasters as well as geoeconomic robustness through diversified alliances (Thompson, 2023; Quilop, 2023). Indonesia as an ally of Pakistan provides avenues of access to ASEAN with its 3.3 trillion economy, which can be subject to RCEP observer status that would allow Pakistan to avoid the risks of American sanctions and focus more on economic diplomacy than military alliances (Pongsudhirak, 2023).

Additionally, the synergies of the BRI can be employed as an opportunity for the Global Maritime Fulcrum in Indonesia is compatible with the CPEC in Pakistan, which is opening the possibilities to connectivity projects such as collaborative infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region (Xue, 2023). This would offset the Quad role of India by advancing other economic corridors, and Indonesia would encourage Pakistan to be fully integrated in the ASEAN (Esti, 2026; Sharif, 2025). These dynamics enable both countries to exploit the ASEAN region to act as a buffer as they seek to rake in investments and technology transfers without having to be too reliant on any given major power, geoeconomically (Luttwak, 1990; Vihma, 2018).

Domestic Challenges

The fiscal instability and political unrest in Pakistan make it difficult to implement agreements, whereas Indonesia's domestic policies, such as biodiesel requirements, affect the stability of palm oil exports, one of the pillars of bilateral trade (Quilop, 2023; Xue, 2023). In 2025, Pakistan's economic crisis—with inflation reaching 25% and external debt exerting pressure—slowed the progress of the PTA and investment outflows, preventing participation in joint ventures with other countries. Domestically, political instability, including government changes and security challenges, further undermines investor confidence, limiting Pakistan's geoeconomic diversification in Southeast Asia (Khaliq, 2024). This is compounded by a lack of practical know-how in ASEAN markets and insufficient expertise in regional standards such as halal certification and digital trade, which hampers deeper integration (Thompson, 2023; Pongsudhirak, 2023).

In view on the above, we posit that Indonesia-Pakistan relations offer various geoeconomic opportunities through ASEAN engagement, trade agreements, and connectivity initiatives such as CPEC and the BRI, with Indonesia facilitating market access and non-alignment diplomacy, yet these opportunities are constrained by Pakistan's domestic economic and political instability, institutional limitations, and Indonesia's policy restrictions, such as biodiesel requirements, alongside exposure to great power competition.

Conclusion

This study employed a geoeconomic framework to analyze Indonesia-Pakistan relations since 2020, demonstrating a clear shift from ideology-driven engagement toward pragmatic, interest-based cooperation. In the context of Indo-Pacific power reconfiguration, global supply-chain disruptions, and post-pandemic economic adjustment, bilateral relations have increasingly been shaped by material considerations, particularly trade expansion, institutional engagement, and selective defense cooperation. The steady rise in bilateral trade—reaching USD 4.2 billion in 2024 and exceeding USD 3.6 billion by November 2025—illustrates that economic pragmatism now constitutes the primary anchor of

the relationship, with Indonesian palm oil and Pakistani textiles and rice forming its commercial core.

At the institutional level, the Indonesia–Pakistan Preferential Trade Agreement and its anticipated upgrade to a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement reflect an effort to move beyond tariff-based trade toward deeper cooperation in services, investment, halal industries, and the digital economy. The establishment of the Joint Trade Committee further signals a commitment to managing structural trade imbalances and non-tariff barriers through sustained policy dialogue. High-level diplomatic exchanges—most notably President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Islamabad in 2025—and the signing of multiple memoranda of understanding across economic, social, and defense sectors underscore the growing salience of economic diplomacy. Concurrently, defense cooperation, including discussions on JF-17 fighter jets and unmanned systems, complements this geoeconomic trajectory by linking export diversification with strategic signaling.

Despite these advances, several constraints continue to shape bilateral engagement. Pakistan’s limited economic capacity, political volatility, and weak integration into ASEAN’s institutional architecture constrain its ability to fully leverage regional opportunities. Indonesia’s domestic policy priorities, particularly biodiesel mandates affecting palm oil exports, introduce additional uncertainties into the economic relationship. Moreover, intensifying US–China competition in the Indo-Pacific complicates the strategic environment for both countries. Pakistan seeks to balance relations with Beijing and Washington amid domestic economic fragility, while Indonesia endeavors to maintain its non-aligned posture without undermining ASEAN cohesion. These factors demonstrate that geoeconomic opportunities remain closely mediated by domestic vulnerabilities, institutional readiness, and regional power politics.

Within this broader setting, Indonesia’s leadership role in ASEAN offers Pakistan indirect access to Southeast Asia’s expanding market, even as Islamabad remains confined to Sectoral Dialogue Partner status. The findings suggest that Pakistan could benefit from a calibrated multi-alignment approach—drawing lessons from India—by balancing relations with Jakarta, Washington, and Beijing to avoid

overdependence and enhance strategic flexibility in a multipolar Asia.

To translate existing potential into durable outcomes, this study advances five policy recommendations: first, the creation of a bilateral task force to reduce bureaucratic bottlenecks, improve connectivity, and strengthen people-to-people exchanges; second, targeted capacity-building for Pakistani firms to meet ASEAN standards, particularly in halal trade and digital services; third, coordinated engagement in ASEAN-led forums to mitigate great-power pressures through inclusive economic corridors linking CPEC and the BRI; fourth, alignment of Indonesia’s palm oil sustainability and biodiesel policies with Pakistan’s energy requirements through technology transfer; and fifth, greater utilization of D-8 and OIC platforms to reinforce multi-alignment and geoeconomic diplomacy. Collectively, these measures would support the evolution of Indonesia–Pakistan relations from largely transactional exchanges toward a more resilient and strategically grounded partnership.

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Peran ASEAN dalam Mempromosikan Perdamaian dan Hak Asasi Manusia di Myanmar (2020-2023)

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ABSTRACT

Selama puluhan tahun pasca kemerdekaannya pada 1948 dari kolonialisme Inggris, Myanmar telah berjuang melawan kekuasaan militer, konflik antar suku, pemerintahan yang buruk dan kemiskinan yang meluas. Transisi dari pemerintahan otoriter ke pemerintahan demokratis yang dimulai pada tahun 2011 memicu harapan akan reformasi demokrasi. Namun dominasi militer tetap berpengaruh besar terhadap kendali pemerintahan. Kudeta militer pada Februari 2021 telah menghancurkan harapan akan reformasi demokrasi di Myanmar. Myanmar mendapat kecaman dari dunia internasional atas tindakan kekerasan yang dilakukan junta militer kepada masyarakat sipil. Di saat yang sama, aksi unjuk rasa anti kudeta menuntut agar militer mengembalikan kekuasaan kepada pemimpin Myanmar yang terpilih secara demokratis dan menuntut pembebasan pejuang demokrasi di Myanmar. Sementara itu, ASEAN sebagai organisasi regional yang menaungi Myanmar, dianggap lamban dan tidak tegas terhadap junta militer Myanmar. ASEAN dinilai kurang berdaya untuk mengembalikan stabilitas keamanan dan tegaknya nilai-nilai HAM di Myanmar. Lambannya ASEAN itu dipengaruhi sejumlah hambatan internal maupun eksternal. Namun di tengah keterbatasannya sebagai organisasi regional, ASEAN tetap gigih melakukan langkah-langkah untuk memulihkan keadilan, mengatasi krisis kemanusiaan, dan krisis keamanan di Myanmar dalam rangka menjaga stabilitas politik dan keamanan di kawasan Asia Tenggara.

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1. Pendahuluan

Myanmar merupakan negara berkembang di Asia Tenggara, mendapat kemerdekaan dari Inggris tahun 1948, sejak merdeka hingga tahun 1962, Myanmar dipimpin oleh seorang Perdana Menteri dengan sistem pemerintahan demokrasi parlementer, namun pada tahun 1962 terjadi pengambil alihan kekuasaan oleh militer (kudeta

militer pertama) yang dipimpin oleh Jenderal Ne Win, pemerintahan U Nu dianggap tidak mampu memimpin Myanmar. Pasca kudeta, pada tahun 1974, Ne Win sebagai pemimpin Myanmar membentuk konstitusi baru berdasarkan kebijakan luar negeri yang bersifat isolasionis dan program sosialis dan membentuk pemerintahan satu partai yaitu Partai Program Sosialis Burma yang berkuasa.

Pada 8 Agustus 1988, terjadi pemberontakan dan unjuk rasa oleh masyarakat sipil dan para biksu yang menuntut penghapusan kekuasaan militer dan menuntut demokrasi, selain itu ada hal mendasar yang memicu terjadinya demonstrasi berskala besar adalah karena memburuknya perekonomian Myanmar. Masyarakat Myanmar tidak tahan dengan kesulitan ekonomi, mereka menginginkan pemerintahan baru yang dapat membantu meningkatkan ekonomi dan kehidupan mereka dengan menempatkan negara di jalan demokrasi.

Pasca pemberontakan 1988, pemerintah melaksanakan pemilihan umum demokratis pada tahun 1990. Pemilu dimenangkan oleh partai oposisi yang sangat populer yaitu partai *National League of Democracy* (NLD) namun kemenangan tidak diakui oleh pihak militer, kekalahan militer memperlakukan pemerintah yang telah memerintah selama hampir 30 tahun (1962-1990), pihak militer mengambil alih kekuasaan dan menahan para tokoh NLD, kondisi ekonomi Myanmar lesu, terputus dari eksternal baik regional dan internasional, Myanmar kehilangan identitas di seluruh dunia setelah terjadi pengambil alihan kekuasaan oleh militer (kudeta militer kedua). Tahun 1993 pemerintah militer mencoba membentuk konstitusi baru namun gagal terlaksana karena ditentang oleh kubu politik menganggap bahwa proses penyusunan konstitusi tidak demokratis.

Demokratisasi di Myanmar mulai berproses kembali di tahun 2003, pemerintahan militer mempersiapkan untuk menyusun konstitusi baru yang tujuannya adalah menjamin dominasi militer. Penyusunan konstitusi baru selesai pada tahun 2008, dan akhirnya Myanmar memiliki UUD 2008 walaupun didalam prosesnya dianggap masih banyak manipulasi yang dilakukan oleh pihak militer. Konstitusi ini pada konsepnya digunakan untuk mempersiapkan pemilu-pemilu kedepan, Dimana didalam konstitusi ini disebutkan *konstitutional arrangement* dengan formula yaitu 25% anggota parlemen akan diangkat dari anggota aktif militer dan 75% diberikan ke kursi yang dipertaruhkan oleh partai politik

Tahun 2010 mulai dilakukan reformasi politik, Myanmar melaksanakan pemilu pertamanya sejak tahun 1990, yang secara resmi mengakhiri kediktatoran militer selama 22 tahun. Pemilu tahun 2010 dalam rangka menentukan pemimpin baru Myanmar, pemilu ini dimaksudkan untuk

memberi kesan bahwa militer akan menciptakan pemerintahan yang sah dan demokratis. Dengan dilaksanakannya pemilu secara demokratis, bukan berarti pihak militer dengan begitu saja mau menyerahkan kekuasaan yang dipegangnya, karena pihak militer sudah membentuk partai boneka yaitu *Union Solidarity & Development Party* (USDP). Pada pemilu tahun 2010 partai USDP bentukan militer meraih suara mayoritas dan Thein Sein menjadi kandidat Presiden dari partai USDP dan diangkat menjadi pemimpin baru Myanmar.

Atas desakan dunia internasional pemilihan umum demokratis kembali dilaksanakan di Myanmar pada tahun 2015, hasilnya adalah partai USDP bentukan militer kalah suara dan partai NLD menang hampir 80%.¹ Hasil pemilu ini menimbulkan permasalahan, berdasarkan aturan yang tertuang dalam konstitusi Myanmar yang dibentuk pada tahun 2008, di dalam konstitusi disebutkan bahwa presiden Myanmar tidak boleh ada kaitan keluarga dengan WNA baik suami atau anak yang memiliki kewarganegaraan asing. Dengan adanya ketentuan ini, maka Aung Suu Kyi tidak bisa menjadi Presiden karena bertentangan dengan konstitusi. Akhirnya Aung San Suu Kyi membentuk sendiri jabatan sebagai penasehat negara (*State Canselor*) yang berada di atas jabatan presiden, meskipun konstitusi tidak mengatur masalah ini. Dalam masa 2015-2020 Jenderal Ming Aun Wen dijadikan Presiden menggantikan posisi Aung San Suu Kyi.

Pemilihan umum dilaksanakan lima tahun kemudian pada 8 November 2020, transisi menuju demokrasi di Myanmar semakin mendapatkan momentumnya, NLD memenangkan pemilu dengan suara yang cukup signifikan mengalahkan partai oposisi utama yaitu USDP. Kemenangan memicu ketegangan antara pemerintah sipil dan junta militer. Junta militer (Tatmadaw) menuduh terjadi kecurangan dan manipulasi dan meminta pemilu diulang kembali. Dampak dari ketegangan politik ini adalah terjadinya pengambil alihan kekuasaan oleh junta militer pada 1 Februari 2021, sejumlah tokoh NLD ditangkap dan ditahan oleh militer dan militer mengumumkan keadaan darurat selama 1 tahun kedepan dalam rangka menjaga stabilitas negara. Kekuasaan pemerintahan kemudian diserahkan kepada pemimpin militer untuk melaksanakan tugas sebagai presiden Myanmar. Militer berjanji akan melaksanakan

pemilu demokratis setelah keadaan stabil, namun dari tahun 2021 sampai dengan saat ini (tahun 2024) belum terlaksana pemilihan umum di Myanmar.

Disinilah latar belakang permasalahan yang akan penulis angkat, mengapa proses demokratisasi di Myanmar tidak dapat berjalan damai, apa yang salah dengan transisi demokrasi di Myanmar. Rumusan masalah pada penelitian ini meliputi:

1. Bagaimana peran organisasi regional ASEAN dalam mendorong demokratisasi di Myanmar?
2. ASEAN dalam mengatasi krisis kemanusiaan dan instabilitas keamanan di Myanmar tahun 2020-2023?

Metode dalam penelitian ini adalah deskriptif analitis dengan pendekatan kualitatif. Penelitian ini dilakukan dalam setting waktu tahun 2020-2023 dengan menganalisis, menginvestigasi dan memahami fenomena yang terjadi, dimana peneliti mencari kejelasan data secara komprehensif mengenai isu Myanmar, pendekatan tersebut dimaksudkan untuk menguji relevansi teori terhadap suatu peristiwa di bidang sosial dan politik karena kompleksitasnya. Teknik pengumpulan data, peneliti menggunakan data primer dan data sekunder.

Data primer diperoleh diantaranya melalui *in-dept interview* yaitu dilakukan diskusi dan komunikasi dengan para narasumber meliputi tokoh politik, dosen, pejabat publik, konsulat jenderal, diplomat, aktifis, perwakilan organisasi internasional, berikut antara lain: (1) Bapak Dr. Priyambudi Sulistiyanto merupakan dosen di Flinders University, Australia; (2) Bapak R. Sigit Witjaksono merupakan Konsul Jenderal RI untuk Kuching dan (3) Ibu Yuyun Wahyuningrum merupakan seorang diplomat, aktifis HAM dan wakil Indonesia untuk AICHR. *Interview* dilakukan untuk memperoleh pendapat dan pandangan terkait sejarah Myanmar, kudeta militer dan pelanggaran HAM di Myanmar.

Selanjutnya untuk data sekunder diperoleh dari studi dokumen berupa laporan, peraturan, media domestik dan internasional, buku-buku, dan jurnal. Data yang dihasilkan dari wawancara dengan informan selanjutnya digunakan untuk mengonfirmasi data yang diperoleh dari studi dokumen. Dari data-data yang diperoleh selanjutnya dilakukan analisis untuk menghasilkan data yang bersifat deskriptif yaitu data yang

dinamis bisa berubah sesuai dengan situasi dan kondisi yang terjadi dilapangan.

Neo-Liberalisme, Regionalisme, Kepentingan Nasional & Teori Organisasi Internasional: Sebuah Kerangka Teoretik

Perspektif paradigma hubungan internasional pada penelitian ini mendasarkan pada teori neoliberalisme yaitu sebuah pendekatan yang menekankan pentingnya lembaga-lembaga internasional, aturan-aturan, dan kerjasama antar negara dalam menciptakan dan mempertahankan stabilitas dan perdamaian global. Neoliberalisme berargumen bahwa norma-norma dan rezim-rezim internasional dapat mempengaruhi perilaku negara dengan menciptakan harapan-harapan bersama dan membentuk perilaku yang diinginkan. Rezim internasional adalah serangkaian aturan, norma, dan prosedur yang disepakati bersama oleh negara-negara untuk mengatur isu-isu tertentu.

Neoliberalism pada prinsipnya adalah pendekatan untuk mempelajari organisasi internasional dan pola kerjasama internasional, aliran pemikiran yang berpendapat bahwa kerjasama internasional antar negara dapat dilakukan secara berkelanjutan dalam mengatasi konflik. Robert O Keohane dan Joseph Nye dianggap sebagai pendiri Neoliberalism, inti dari argumennya adalah bahwa negara adalah aktor rasional dan tindakan negara seringkali dapat diprediksi, menekankan pentingnya lembaga dan pembentukan pengaturan yang dilembagakan berisi aturan dan prinsip-prinsip yang mempromosikan kerja sama (Keohane, 1984).

Neoliberalisme percaya bahwa kerjasama antar negara adalah mungkin dan dapat difasilitasi melalui lembaga-lembaga internasional. Lembaga-lembaga ini dapat mengurangi ketidakpastian dan meningkatkan transparansi serta kepercayaan antar negara. Negara-negara dianggap sebagai aktor rasional yang mengejar kepentingan mereka, tetapi aktor non-negara seperti perusahaan multinasional, organisasi non-pemerintah, dan kelompok masyarakat sipil juga memainkan peran penting dalam hubungan internasional. Neoliberalisme menekankan bahwa interdependensi ekonomi antar negara mendorong perdamaian dan stabilitas.

Arthur Stein dan Robert Axelrod mengemukakan bahwasanya pendapat terkait

anarki di dalam sistem internasional memanglah suatu yang benar dan tak terhindarkan. Mereka juga mengakui bahwa anarki pada akhirnya menjadi sebuah rintangan bagi negara untuk membangun kerja sama. Hal ini kemudian membuat kehadiran institusi internasional diperlukan agar bisa menjadi wadah bagi negara dalam membangun hubungan kerjasama di tengah situasi sistem internasional yang anarki. Para neoliberalis juga percaya bahwasanya institusi internasional mengemban tugas penting sebagai mediator dalam menjembatani kepentingan-kepentingan setiap aktor di dalam sistem internasional (Dugis 2018).

Teori lainnya dari Samuel P. Huntington adalah ilmuwan politik dari Amerika Serikat, dalam bukunya yang berjudul "*The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*" (1991), menjelaskan perkembangan politik global dan revolusi demokrasi global pada akhir abad ke 20 (antara 1974 dan 1990), Huntington menganalisis sebab dan hakikat revolusi demokrasi yang bersifat global. Demokrasi memiliki konsekuensi positif bagi kebebasan individu, stabilitas domestic dan perdamaian internasional. Huntington berpendapat bahwa proses demokrasi tidak berjalan sederhana tetapi memerlukan berbagai tahapan yang perlu dijejaki sebelum sampai pada yang dicita-citakan. Huntington menjelaskan bagaimana transisi demokrasi dapat berlangsung dalam 4 skenario besar yaitu meliputi:

1. Transformasi, dimana rezim yang berkuasa memimpin dalam mewujudkan demokrasi;
2. Replacement, dimana kelompok oposisi memimpin dalam mewujudkan demokrasi;
3. Transplacement, demokrasi terjadi dari aksi bersama rezim berkuasa dengan oposisi; dan
4. Intervensi, yakni adanya kekuatan pihak luar dalam menjatuhkan rezim yang berkuasa.

Demokratisasi menurut Huntington adalah transisi politik suatu negara yang datang melalui berbagai bentuk, termasuk transisi rezim otoriter ke demokrasi parsial, demokrasi parsial ke demokrasi penuh atau transisi dari otoriter langsung ke demokrasi penuh. Demokratisasi menurut Huntington dapat dipecah menjadi tiga gelombang besar sepanjang Sejarah, dan gelombang ketiga yang paling relevan di negara berkembang yaitu dengan rezim otoriter, bahwa penyebab demokratisasi gelombang ketiga dikaitkan dengan hilangnya legitimasi rezim otoriter dan demokratisasi didorong oleh

tekanan internasional yang dipaksakan oleh negara-negara demokratis baik melalui ketergantungan ekonomi, bantuan asing atau melalui organisasi non pemerintah.

Teori lain dari Jean Grugel seorang ilmuwan, dalam tulisan bukunya yang berjudul "*Democratization A Critical Introduction*", dijelaskan tentang hubungan antara demokrasi dan demokratisasi bahwa demokratisasi adalah transformasi sistem politik dari non demokrasi menuju pemerintahan yang akuntabel dan representative, demokrasi adalah tatanan politik bukan ekonomi, namun hak ekonomi mempengaruhi hak politik. Demokrasi tidak dapat terjadi tanpa reformasi sosial-ekonomi, budaya-sosial dan transformasi dari hubungan gender. Serangkaian tekanan dan peristiwa global dapat membuka peluang politik bagi demokratisasi pada akhir abad kedua puluh, menurut pandangan Grugel terlepas dari berbagai tekanan dan peristiwa global untuk demokratisasi, konsolidasi demokratisasi ditentukan secara nasional. Dimana keberhasilan demokratisasi dipengaruhi oleh dua faktor, yang pertama adalah munculnya masyarakat sipil yang kuat, solid dan bersemangat yang bekerja secara konsisten untuk mendemokratisasikan politik dan meminta pertanggungjawaban negara. Yang kedua adalah keberadaan negara yang mampu dan fleksibel.

Teori peran dan organisasi internasional menurut Clive Archer dalam bukunya yang berjudul *International Organization*, dalam tulisannya, "*three major roles can be identified: those of instrument, arena and actor*".ⁱⁱ Menurut Archer, terdapat 3 (tiga) peran organisasi internasional secara umum, yaitu: (1) organisasi internasional sebagai instrument, dimana organisasi internasional difungsikan sebagai instrument dalam melakukan diplomasi dalam rangka mencapai kepentingan suatu negara; (2) organisasi internasional sebagai arena, dimana organisasi berfungsi sebagai forum, tempat dimana didalamnya para anggota dapat melakukan negosiasi, diplomasi, merumuskan kesepakatan, merumuskan perjanjian-perjanjian internasional dalam mengakomodir kepentingan-kepentingan negara anggotanya; (3) organisasi internasional sebagai actor, dalam hal ini organisasi internasional merupakan actor independent yang dianggap mampu bertindak secara independent tanpa dipengaruhi oleh kekuatan manapun.

Akar Sejarah Konflik Myanmar

Myanmar adalah sebuah negara kecil di kawasan Asia Tenggara dengan jumlah penduduk kurang lebih 50 juta orang. Sejak memperoleh kemerdekaannya pada 4 Januari 1948, Myanmar tidak pernah sepi dari pergolakan politik dan kudeta militer yang silih berganti. Ketika Myanmar merdeka pada tahun 1948 (waktu itu bernama Burma), di bawah pemerintahan sipil U Nu, mencoba menjalankan pemerintahan yang demokratis dengan menerapkan sistem parlementer. Sebagaimana halnya negara yang baru merdeka, pemerintahan U Nu juga dihadapkan pada keadaan sosial-politik yang rumit. Dengan strategi pembangunan negara yang makmur, U Nu berusaha keras menyelesaikan berbagai persoalan kompleks yang muncul, baik yang berkenaan dengan aspek perekonomian, pembelotan maupun pemberontakan.ⁱⁱⁱ Keterlibatan militer dimulai ketika Jenderal Ne Win ditugaskan untuk mengendalikan ketertiban dan mempersiapkan pemilu tahun 1960. Pemerintahan militer saat itu berhasil memulihkan keadaan dalam negeri sampai terselenggaranya pemilu tahun 1960 yang dimenangkan oleh U Nu dan partainya, Union Party. Pihak militer kemudian mengultimatum pemerintah sipil dengan memberikan waktu selama 2 tahun untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan-permasalahan yang dihadapi Myanmar. Karena pemerintah sipil tidak dapat menata kembali kondisi dalam negeri Myanmar yang semakin diperparah dengan kegagalan U Nu dalam menata sistem perekonomian dan administrasi Myanmar, maka timbul ketidakpuasan di kalangan pro-militer. Akhirnya pada 2 Maret 1962, militer melakukan kudeta di bawah pimpinan Jenderal Ne Win.^{iv}

Keberhasilan kudeta atas pemerintahan U Nu pada tahun 1962 bisa dikatakan sebagai awal keruntuhan demokrasi di Myanmar. Selama masa pemerintahannya (1962-1988) Ne Win hanya mengakui satu partai politik, yaitu *Burmese Socialist Program Party* (BSPP) partai tunggal yang dibentuk untuk mendukung program sosialis Burma dengan mayoritas anggota berasal dari golongan militer, dengan sistem pemerintahan kediktatoran militer yang represif dengan kebijakan ekonomi sosialis dan mengisolasi Burma dari internasional, Ne Win mengubah Myanmar menjadi negara miskin dan tertinggal. Korupsi dan tata kelola pemerintah yang buruk juga telah mendorong sebagian

aktivitas ekonomi ke pasar gelap, karena keadaan Myanmar yang semakin merosot, pada tahun 1988 terjadilah pemberontakan dan demonstrasi besar yang dikenal dengan pemberontakan 8888 yang dipelopori oleh aktivis mahasiswa, di dukung oleh rakyat dan para biksu Budha, namun ditindas dengan kekerasan militer oleh Jenderal Saw Maung.^v Pemberontakan tersebut mendorong Ne Win untuk mundur dan pada akhirnya Ne Win mengundurkan diri kemudian militer mengumumkan keadaan darurat dan Jenderal Saw Maung mengambil alih kekuasaan pemerintahan. Sebagaimana pendahulunya, pemerintahan militer Jenderal Saw Maung juga memimpin dengan sistem otoriter.

Setelah pemberontakan tahun 1988 dan atas desakan masyarakat, pemerintah berjanji akan segera melaksanakan pemilihan umum demokratis hingga akhirnya tahun 1990 pemilu demokratis pertama dilaksanakan. Pemilu dimenangkan oleh partai oposisi yang sangat populer di mata rakyat yaitu partai *National League of Democracy* (NLD) namun kemenangan tidak diakui oleh pihak militer, kekalahan militer memperlakukan pemerintah yang telah memerintah selama hampir 30 tahun (1962-1990), pihak militer mengambil alih kekuasaan dan menahan para tokoh NLD, kondisi ekonomi Myanmar lesu, terputus dari eksternal baik regional dan internasional, Myanmar kehilangan identitas di seluruh dunia setelah terjadi pengambil alihan kekuasaan oleh militer (kudeta militer kedua). Tahun 1993 pemerintah militer mencoba membentuk konstitusi baru namun gagal terlaksana karena ditentang oleh kubu politik menganggap bahwa proses penyusunan konstitusi tidak demokratis.

Demokratisasi di Myanmar mulai berproses kembali di tahun 2003, proses menuju demokrasi yang mulai disuarakan, membuat pemerintahan militer kembali mempersiapkan untuk menyusun konstitusi baru yang tujuannya adalah menjamin dominasi militer. Penyusunan konstitusi baru selesai pada tahun 2008, dan akhirnya Myanmar memiliki UUD 2008 walaupun didalam prosesnya dianggap masih banyak manipulasi yang dilakukan oleh pihak militer dan pihak oposisi (partai NLD) juga memboikot konstitusi tersebut karena penyusunannya dianggap tidak demokratis. Konstitusi ini pada konsepnya digunakan untuk mempersiapkan pemilu-pemilu kedepan, Dimana didalam konstitusi ini disebutkan *konstitusional arrangement*

dengan formula yaitu 25% anggota parlemen akan diangkat dari anggota aktif militer dan 75% diberikan ke kursi yang dipertaruhkan oleh partai politik

Pada tahun 2010 mulai dilakukan reformasi politik, Myanmar melaksanakan pemilu pertamanya sejak tahun 1990, yang secara resmi mengakhiri kediktatoran militer selama 22 tahun. Pemilu tahun 2010 dalam rangka menentukan pemimpin baru Myanmar, pemilu ini dimaksudkan untuk memberi kesan bahwa militer akan menciptakan pemerintahan yang sah dan demokratis, pada kenyataannya, pemilu dirancang untuk mempertahankan kekuasaan militer di bawah topeng demokrasi. Dengan dilaksanakannya pemilu secara demokratis, bukan berarti pihak militer dengan begitu saja mau menyerahkan kekuasaan yang dipegangnya, karena pihak militer sudah membentuk partai boneka yaitu *Union Solidarity & Development Party* (USDP), partai ini menjadi instrument yang digunakan oleh militer untuk mempertahankan kekuasaan dan pengaruhnya di Tengah demokratisasi di Myanmar. Pada pemilu tahun 2010 partai USDP bentukan militer meraih suara mayoritas dan Thein Sein menjadi kandidat Presiden dari partai USDP dan diangkat menjadi pemimpin baru Myanmar. Banyak dugaan bahwa hasil pemilu tersebut dimanipulasi oleh pihak militer, namun diadakannya pemilu dan terpilihnya pemimpin secara demokratis menandai berakhirnya pemerintah militer di negara Myanmar, walaupun demikian pengaruh militer di negara ini masih cukup besar salah satunya melalui partai USDP dan hak-hak Istimewa yang didapatkan militer dalam pemerintahan, seperti mendapatkan jatah kursi khusus di parlemen tanpa melewati pemilu dan juga berbagai jatah kursi kekuasaan yang berkaitan dengan bidang pertahanan dan keamanan seperti menteri pertahanan, menteri perbatasan dan menteri dalam negeri.

Atas desakan dari dunia internasional pemilihan umum demokratis kembali dilaksanakan di Myanmar pada tahun 2015, dimana partisipasi publik meningkat pesat terutama di kalangan Perempuan. Hasilnya adalah partai USDP bentukan militer kalah suara dan partai NLD menang hampir 80%.^{vi} Hasil pemilu ini menimbulkan permasalahan, berdasarkan aturan yang tertuang dalam konstitusi Myanmar yang dibentuk pada tahun 2008, di dalam konstitusi disebutkan bahwa presiden Myanmar tidak

boleh ada kaitan keluarga dengan WNA baik suami atau anak yang memiliki kewarganegaraan asing. Dengan adanya ketentuan ini, maka Aung Suu Kyi tidak bisa menjadi Presiden karena bertentangan dengan konstitusi. Akhirnya Aung San Suu Kyi membentuk sendiri jabatan sebagai penasihat negara (*State Counselor*) yang berada di atas jabatan presiden, padahal konstitusi tidak mengatur tentang masalah ini. Dalam masa 2015-2020 Jenderal Ming Aun Wen dijadikan Presiden menggantikan posisi Aung San Suu Kyi.

Pemilihan umum demokratis kembali dilaksanakan lima tahun kemudian tepatnya pada 8 November 2020, transisi menuju demokrasi di Myanmar semakin mendapatkan momentumnya, dimana NLD kembali memenangkan pemilu dengan suara yang cukup signifikan. Partai NLD dibawah kepemimpinan Aung San Suu Kyi sebagai pengusung demokrasi mengalahkan partai oposisi utama yaitu USDP. Namun kemenangan NLD atas USDP tidak lantas berjalan damai, kemenangan tersebut justru memicu ketegangan antara pemerintah sipil dan junta militer. Junta militer (Tatmadaw) menuduh terjadi kecurangan dan manipulasi atas kemenangan tersebut dan meminta pemilu diulang kembali. Dampak dari ketegangan politik ini adalah terjadinya pengambil alihan kekuasaan (kudeta militer) dari pemerintahan *de facto* hasil pemilu demokrasi oleh junta militer pada 1 Februari 2021, akibatnya sejumlah tokoh NLD ditangkap dan ditahan oleh militer dan militer mengumumkan keadaan darurat selama 1 tahun kedepan dalam rangka menjaga stabilitas negara. Dalam kondisi seperti ini, kekuasaan pemerintahan kemudian diserahkan kepada pemimpin militer dengan kekuasaan penuh diberikan kepada Jenderal Min Aung Hlaing (Panglima Tertinggi Tatmadaw) dan Tatmadaw juga mengangkat Jenderal U Mynt Swe untuk melaksanakan tugas sebagai penjabat presiden Myanmar. Militer berjanji akan melaksanakan pemilu demokratis setelah keadaan stabil, namun dari tahun 2021 sampai dengan saat ini (tahun 2024) belum terlaksana pemilihan umum di Myanmar.

ASEAN sebagai organisasi regional yang menaungi Myanmar dihadapkan pada tantangan untuk dapat mengatasi persoalan negara anggotanya, yaitu krisis keamanan dan kemanusiaan di Myanmar namun tetap berpedoman pada nilai-nilai ASEAN. Indonesia, Malaysia,

Singapura, dan Thailand di Komisi Hak Asasi Manusia ASEAN (AICHR) mendesak Myanmar untuk menghormati prinsip-prinsip dalam Piagam ASEAN dan Deklarasi HAM ASEAN. Dimana Piagam ASEAN antara lain menyebut “kepatuhan terhadap aturan hukum, tata kelola pemerintahan yang baik, prinsip-prinsip dmeokrasi, perlindungan HAM, dan menghormati kebebasan mendasar. Myanmar sebagai anggota ASEAN harus berkomitmen nilai-nilai yang dinyatakan dalam Piagam ASEAN 2008 untuk mematuhi prinsip-prinsip demokrasi, supremasi hukum dan pemerintahan yang baik, penghormatan dan perlindungan HAM dan kebebasan fundamental. Karena ketidakmampuan ASEAN untuk menghentikan kekerasan di Myanmar kemungkinan akan memperburuk hubungannya dengan Barat, jika hubungan dengan Barat memburuk maka kapasitas ASEAN untuk meredam agresivitas Tiongkok juga akan melemah

Dampak Konflik terhadap Aspek Sosial-Politik & Keamanan Myanmar

Dampak konflik Myanmar terhadap keamanan di kawasan Asia Tenggara, bahwa junta militer telah menghancurkan supremasi hukum. Pasukan keamanan bertanggung jawab atas kematian pengunjuk rasa, melakukan tindakan kriminal yang kejam, menyerang warga sipil dan membuat masyarakat di seluruh Myanmar tidak aman. Puluhan ribu orang meninggalkan Myanmar, mencari perlindungan ke negara tetangga, diantaranya Thailand, India, dan China. Ledakan aktivitas kriminal transnasional telah melanda wilayah tersebut, dimana Thailand melaporkan peningkatan signifikan dalam kejahatan terkait narkoba, dan otoritas Tiongkok telah menangkap sejumlah orang yang menyeberang secara ilegal melalui perbatasan Myanmar-Tiongkok. Konflik Myanmar yang terus berlanjut akan mengguncang stabilitas di ASEAN dan menimbulkan ancaman utama terhadap penegakan hukum Asia Tenggara.

Selanjutnya, kudeta militer tidak hanya menjadi kemunduran proses demokrasi namun berdampak besar pada perekonomian Myanmar, mendorong hampir separuh penduduknya ke dalam kemiskinan dan menghapus kemajuan yang telah dicapai selama bertahun-tahun. Perubahan peta investasi dimungkinkan jika rezim militer kembali mencengkeram, investor asing


dari barat yang datang selama satu decade terakhir bersiap menarik investasinya, rendahnya lapangan kerja, tingginya harga, kontrol mata uang, pembekuan aset, sanksi internasional, embargo ekonomi akan menekan ekonomi Myanmar, dan meningkatnya konflik menggambarkan gambaran suram bagi pemulihan ekonomi Myanmar. Prospek pertumbuhan Myanmar sangat bergantung pada proyek infrastruktur utama dan investasi asing langsung. Myanmar masuk dalam daftar hitam oleh gugus tugas aksi keuangan, yang mana hal ini merusak reputasi Myanmar dan menghalangi investasi. Sanksi terhadap bank milik negara menghentikan hubungan negara-negara lain dengan bank-bank Myanmar. Pendapatan pajak turun dan ekspor gas menurun akibat kurangnya produksi dan gangguan akibat konflik di wilayah perbatasan. Memburuknya ekonomi Myanmar juga terlihat diberbagai indikator sosial yaitu belanja public untuk kesehatan dan pendidikan.^{vii}

Pertumbuhan PDB Myanmar mengalami penurunan pada tahun 2020-2023. Pergolakan politik sejak perebutan kekuasaan telah berdampak banyak pada kehidupan masyarakat, anak-anak tidak bisa sekolah, pendidikan, kesehatan dan mata pencaharian semuanya mengalami kemunduran. Kudeta Myanmar menyisakan berbagai dampak sosial termasuk pelanggaran HAM.

Pertumbuhan PDB Riil Myanmar Tahun 2018-2022



Tingkat PDB dan Inflasi Myanmar Tahun 2015-2024




Pertumbuhan Produk Domestik Bruto, ketid-akstabilan dan konflik menghambat pertumbuhan




Sumber: Bank Sentral Myanmar

Konflik perbatasan merugikan perdagangan



Sumber: Kementerian Perdagangan Myanmar

Kematian yang dilaporkan akibat konflik dan demonstrasi, 1 Feb 2021-21 Jan 2022



Respon Negara-Negara Asia Tenggara & Dunia Internasional terhadap Konflik Myanmar

Negara-negara di Asia Tenggara telah bereaksi terhadap kudeta di Myanmar dengan berbagai cara yang mencerminkan kepentingan yang berbeda. Berikut respon dari negara anggota ASEAN terhadap kudeta militer Myanmar 1 Februari 2021:

No	Negara	Respon
1.	Brunei Darussalam	Posisi Brunei saat kudeta terjadi adalah sebagai ketua ASEAN, tetapi Brunei menahan diri untuk mengomentari atas situasi yang terjadi di Myanmar. Brunei bereaksi dengan membuat pernyataan yang mendorong "dialog, rekonsiliasi dan kembalinya keadaan normal sesuai dengan keinginan dan kepentingan rakyat Myanmar", dan mengingatkan "tujuan dan prinsip-prinsip yang diabadikan dalam Piagam ASEAN, termasuk kepatuhan terhadap prinsip-prinsip demokrasi, supremasi hukum dan pemerintahan yang baik, penghormatan dan perlindungan hak asasi manusia dan kebebasan mendasar.vii Dan Brunei lambat dalam memfasilitasi pertemuan dan pemilihan utusan khusus, mengabaikan seruan partisipasi dari warga sipil CRPH dan NUG, dan pada bulan April Brunei memfasilitasi pertemuan dengan junta tanpa memberitahu anggota ASEAN lainnya.
2.	Kamboja	Kamboja secara terbuka menyambut Min Aung Hlaing sebagai pemimpin Burma, tetapi juga menyesali kekerasan yang dilakukan junta terhadap warga negara, dan berjanji memberikan dukungan kemanusiaan, namun Kamboja juga berkomitmen untuk tidak melakukan campur tangan.
3.	Indonesia	Melalui Kementerian Luar Negeri menyatakan keprihatinan atas perkembangan politik di Myanmar, meminta Myanmar untuk mematuhi supremasi hukum, penggunaan prinsip-prinsip demokrasi dan pemerintahan yang konstitusional. Indonesia juga menggarisbawahi bahwa perselisihan terkait hasil pemilu kiranya dapat diselesaikan dengan mekanisme hukum yang tersedia dan mendesak semua pihak di Myanmar menahan diri dan mengedepankan pendekatan dialog dalam mencari jalan keluar yang ada sehingga situasi tidak semakin memburuk.ix
4.	Laos	Seperti Kamboja, tidak banyak memberikan statement namun berjanji memberikan dukungan kemanusiaan.
5.	Malaysia	Malaysia telah menjadi kritikus yang paling vokal, menyerukan pembebasan segera Aung San Suu Kyi dan para pemimpin politik lainnya, pemulihan status quo di bawah pemerintahan NLD, dan pasukan keamanan untuk menahan kekerasan junta. Memberikan statement bahwa jika situasi memburuk, ASEAN harus mengganggapnya sebagai ancaman serius terhadap perdamaian dan stabilitas regional.
6.	Filipina	Filipina dengan tegas mengindikasikan bahwa tidak akan ikut campur dalam urusan Myanmar, namun mengatakan bahwa hal ini bukan berarti Filipina mendukung tindakan junta.
7.	Singapura	Mengutuk kekerasan para jenderal terhadap pengunjuk rasa anti kudeta. Singapura mengkritik junta, menyebut bahwa kekerasan yang dilakukan junta terhadap warga negara sebagai "puncak rasa malu nasional" dan mengatakan bahwa ketegangan yang terus berlanjut di Myanmar mengancam akan merusak stabilitas regional. Namun, Singapura menyatakan keinginannya untuk terlibat dengan junta, bukan mengisolasi junta.
8.	Thailand	Thailand berusaha untuk tidak ikut campur dalam "urusan dalam negeri" Myanmar, namun mengisyaratkan bahwa mereka melakukan diplomasi diam-diam. Pada saat yang sama, Thailand perlu mengatasi berbagai insiden junta serta migrasi yang terus berlanjut yang disebabkan oleh krisis yang sedang berlangsung.
9.	Vietnam	Vietnam telah menyatakan keprihatinannya atas kekerasan dan kematian, dan menyerukan kepada Dewan Keamanan PBB untuk melakukan dialog dan demokrasi di Myanmar.

Sumber: Forum Asia BN 2021/2044: 26 Oktober 2021

Respon Internasional dan Organisasi Internasional

No	Negara	Respon
1.	Amerika Serikat	Presiden Joe Biden menyatakan bahwa militer Myanmar harus melepaskan kekuasaan yang telah mereka rebut, membebaskan para aktivis dan pendukung serta pejabat yang telah mereka tangkap, mencabut pembatasan telekomunikasi, dan menahan diri dari kekerasan. Dalam sambutannya tentang kebijakan luar negerinya, Biden mengatakan pemerintahannya akan bekerja dengan mitra kami untuk mendukung pemulihan demokrasi dan supremasi hukum dan memberikan konsekuensi pada mereka yang bertanggung jawab.
2.	Asian for Free Election (ANFREL)	mendesak Tatmadaw untuk membebaskan para tahanan dan agar segala kecurangan pemilu diselesaikan melalui peradilan pemilu. Desakan ini merupakan kepedulian berbagai organisasi masyarakat sipil internasional. Melalui pengorganisasian ANFREL, setidaknya ada 46 organisasi masyarakat sipil lintas negara yang bergabung per 3 Februari 2021.
3.	International IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)	menyerukan agar militer Myanmar menghormati sepenuhnya hasil pemilu nasional baru-baru ini, membebaskan semua pemimpin politik dan masyarakat sipil yang ditahan, menahan diri dari melakukan kekerasan, dan mengizinkan negara untuk melembagakan reformasi demokrasi yang nyata. Melalui pernyataan "Defend Democracy in Myanmar" organisasi antarpemerintahan yang bermarkas di Swedia ini menggali dukungan bersama organisasi-organisasi demokrasi lintas negara. Total ada 34 organisasi dan 136 perseorangan bergabung, Perludem dari Indonesia salah satunya.

Langkah Progresif Pendekatan ASEAN terhadap Myanmar

ASEAN memiliki tanggung jawab besar untuk mengupayakan pendekatan terhadap pemerintah Myanmar guna memulihkan demokrasi. Pendekatan dan langkah-langkah ASEAN dalam mengatasi isu Myanmar antara lain:

Tanggapan ASEAN pasca kudeta militer 1 Februari 2021

No	Waktu	Tanggapan
1.	2 Maret 2021	Para pemimpin ASEAN mengadakan Pertemuan Informal Tingkat Menteri ASEAN (IAMM), dan menyatakan dukungan dan keprihatinannya, menyerukan semua pihak untuk menghindari kekerasan dan terlibat dalam dialog.
2.	19 Maret 2021	Indonesia menyerukan agar anggota ASEAN bertemu sesegera mungkin untuk membahas Myanmar, sebuah seruan yang didukung oleh Malaysia dan Singapura.
3.	22 April 2021	Pemerintah Persatuan Nasional (NUG) menulis surat terbuka kepada para pemimpin ASEAN, menyatakan kesediaannya untuk bergabung dalam KTT ASEAN.

4.	24 April 2021	Anggota ASEAN mengadakan forum tingkat tinggi di Jakarta dan Jenderal Min Aung Hlaing hadir pada pertemuan tersebut. Dimana dalam pertemuan tingkat tinggi tersebut menghasilkan konsensus lima poin yang menyerukan penghentian kekerasan; dialog konstruktif; utusan khusus untuk memfasilitasi mediasi; pemberian bantuan kemanusiaan dan utusan khusus serta delegasi untuk mengunjungi Myanmar agar bertemu semua pihak terkait.
4.	26 April 2021	Junta membatalkan komitmen yang telah disepakati pada pertemuan sebelumnya yang tertuang dalam konsensus lima poin. Junta mengatakan bahwa lima poin ASEAN yang disebut 'saran' oleh junta hanya akan dipertimbangkan setelah stabilitas di Myanmar dipulihkan.
5.	27 April 2021	NUG mengatakan bahwa konsensus tidak mencerminkan situasi di Myanmar, dan menolak poin pertama dari konsensus yaitu "semua pihak harus menahan diri", karena hanya militer yang melakukan kekerasan.
6.	11 Mei 2021	Komisaris Tinggi Hak Asasi Manusia PBB mengatakan bahwa junta tidak menunjukkan tanda-tanda mematuhi konsensus, dan meminta ASEAN untuk segera bereaksi dan mengintensifkan tindakan.
7.	23 Mei 2021	Berdasarkan laporan dari salah satu wawancara televisi Tiongkok, Min Aung Hlaing menyampaikan bahwa Min Aung Hlaing tidak melihat bagaimana konsensus dapat dilaksanakan. Sehingga salah satu sumber berpendapat bahwa pemimpin junta belum siap melaksanakan konsensus tersebut.
8.	4 Juni 2021	Perwakilan Brunei bertemu dengan Min Aung Hlaing dan ketua komisi pemilihan junta Thein Soe, dimana pertemuan tersebut dilaporkan membahas kerja sama dengan ASEAN dan prosedur untuk pemilu mendatang. Sedangkan dalam pertemuan tersebut, Brunei sebelumnya tidak memberi tahu dan tidak memberikan laporan setelah pertemuan tersebut kepada ASEAN. Catatan: Pernyataan ASEAN pada hari berikutnya mengatakan bahwa kunjungan perwakilan Brunei adalah dalam rangka untuk memajukan 'solusi damai demi kepentingan rakyat (Burma/Myanmar)' dengan menerapkan konsensus. Serta menyebut Min Aung Hlaing sebagai "ketua" Dewan Administrasi Negara junta untuk pertama kalinya. Namun sejak tanggal 8 Juni 2021 pernyataan tersebut tidak lagi ditemukan di situs web ASEAN.
9.	1 Agustus 2021	Min Aung Hlaing mengatakan junta siap bekerja sama dengan ASEAN dan melakukan dialog dengan utusan khusus masa depan.
10.	4 Agustus 2021	ASEAN mengukuhkan Menteri Luar Negeri Kedua Brunei, Erywan Yusof, sebagai utusan khusus untuk Myanmar. Sekretaris PBB segera menggambarkan penunjukan tersebut sebagai langkah penting untuk mengakhiri krisis di Myanmar. Namun kelompok aktivis Justice For Myanmar mengungkapkan bahwa penunjukan yang telah lama tertunda itu dikompromikan oleh hubungan bisnis antara Perusahaan minyak milik negara Brunei dan Perusahaan Myanmar yang berada di bawah kendali junta, dimana Brunei mempunyai saham di tiga ladang minyak dan gas di Myanmar, dan bermitra dengan militer Myanmar.
11.	18 Agustus 2021	ASEAN mengadakan konferensi virtual tentang bantuan kemanusiaan untuk Myanmar dan menjanjikan memberikan bantuan kemanusiaan dan penanggulangan bencana melalui AHA Centre.

12.	31 Agustus 2021	Menteri Luar Negeri Kedua Brunei, Yusof menyerukan gencatan senjata selama empat bulan untuk memfasilitasi distribusi bantuan Covid-19 dan melaporkan bahwa menteri junta Wunna Maung Lwin telah menerima gencatan senjata tersebut. (sumber: Kyodo News, 5 Sept 2021) Namun NUG menanggapi dengan mengkritik Yusof dengan mengatakan bahwa sebelum menyerukan gencatan senjata untuk menyalurkan bantuan kemanusiaan, utusan khusus seharusnya mendapatkan jaminan dari junta bahwa junta akan menghentikan penangkapan warga sipil dan mengizinkan Yusof untuk bertemu Penasihat Negara Aung San Suu Kyi. (sumber: Irrawady, 6 Sept 2021)
13.	6 September 2021	Junta mengatakan bahwa meskipun mereka mengizinkan kunjungan ASEAN dan tidak akan memblokir bantuan kemanusiaan, junta tidak menerima seruan Yusof untuk melakukan gencatan senjata. (sumber: Irrawady, 7 Sept 2021)
14.	15 Oktober 2021	Ketua ASEAN, Brunei mengumumkan bahwa ASEAN tidak akan mengundang perwakilan junta, namun hanya "perwakilan non-politik," mengingat kurangnya kemajuan dalam penerapan konsensus, dan ASEAN juga tidak mengundang perwakilan NUG.

Rangkaian Konferensi Tingkat Tinggi (KTT) ASEAN Tahun 2021 - 2023

1. KTT ASEAN pada tanggal 24 April 2021, di Sekretariat ASEAN di Jakarta-Indonesia.
Pertemuan para pemimpin ASEAN diselenggarakan pada tanggal 24 April 2021 di Sekretariat ASEAN di Jakarta, yang di ketuai oleh YM Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah (Brunei Darussaalam), dalam pertemuan yang membahas situasi di Myanmar, para pemimpin mencapai kesepakatan atas Konsensus Lima Poin (5PC), isinya adalah sebagai berikut:
 1. Pertama, kekerasan di Myanmar harus segera dihentikan dan semua pihak harus menahan diri sepenuhnya.
 2. Kedua, dialog konstruktif di antara semua pihak terkait harus dimulai untuk mencari Solusi damai demi kepentingan rakyat.
 3. Ketiga, utusan khusus Ketua ASEAN akan memfasilitasi mediasi proses dialog, dengan bantuan Sekretaris Jenderal ASEAN.
 4. Keempat, ASEAN akan memberikan bantuan kemanusiaan melalui AHA Centre.
 5. Kelima, utusan dan delegasi khusus akan mengunjungi Myanmar untuk bertemu dengan semua pihak terkait.
2. KTT ASEAN ke-38 dan ke-39 pada tanggal 26 Oktober 2021, melalui konferensi video.

Terselenggaranya KTT ASEAN di bawah kepemimpinan Brunei Darussalam YM. Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah. KTT dihadiri para pemimpin ASEAN, kecuali Myanmar. ASEAN memutuskan tak mengundang Min Aung Hlaing karena Myanmar tidak menunjukkan komitmen menjalankan 5PC yang disepakati dalam KTT sebelumnya di Jakarta.^x Keputusan Emergency AMM, Myanmar telah diundang pada level non-politik, namun sampai pelaksanaan KTT Myanmar tidak menyampaikan wakil pada level non-politik karena Junta militer menolak mengirimkan perwakilan non politik.

Poin penting KTT ASEAN ke-38 dan ke-39 mengenai perkembangan Myanmar:

ASEAN menyatakan keprihatinan atas situasi di negara tersebut, termasuk laporan mengenai korban jiwa dan kekerasan. ASEAN juga mendengar seruan pembebasan tahanan politik termasuk orang asing. ASEAN menyerukan kepada Myanmar untuk memenuhi komitmennya terhadap Konsensus Lima Poin pada pertemuan pemimpin ASEAN tanggal 24 April 2021, ASEAN menegaskan kembali bahwa Myanmar tetap menjadi anggota keluarga ASEAN dan menyadari bahwa Myanmar memerlukan waktu dan ruang politik untuk menghadapi tantangannya yang banyak dan kompleks. ASEAN tetap berkomitmen untuk mendukung Myanmar dalam upayanya kembali normal sesuai dengan keinginan masyarakat Myanmar.

Tetap menghormati prinsip non-intervensi, ASEAN menegaskan kembali kepatuhan terhadap supremasi hukum, tata pemerintahan yang baik, prinsip-prinsip demokrasi dan pemerintahan konstitusional serta perlunya mencapai keseimbangan yang tepat dalam penerapan prinsip-prinsip ASEAN dalam situasi tersebut di Myanmar. ASEAN sepakat untuk menegaskan kembali keputusan yang diambil pada Pertemuan Darurat Menteri Luar Negeri ASEAN (EAMM) pada tanggal 15 Oktober 2021. ASEAN menyatakan pandangan bahwa kesibukan nasional Myanmar tidak boleh mempengaruhi proses pembangunan Komunitas ASEAN dan pengambilan keputusan.

3. KTT ASEAN ke-40 dan ke-41 pada tanggal 11 November 2022 di Phnom Penh-Kamboja, di bawah Keketuaan Kerajaan Kamboja, KTT

dipimpin oleh Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen PM Kerajaan Kamboja.

Poin penting pada KTT ASEAN ke-40 dan ke-41 mengenai perkembangan Myanmar adalah, pernyataan ASEAN masih sama dengan KTT sebelumnya menyatakan keprihatinan atas krisis politik berkepanjangan termasuk eksekusi 4 aktivis oposisi dan eskalasi kekerasan, ASEAN menyambut baik upaya untuk membantu mengatasi situasi Myanmar termasuk kunjungan ke Myanmar oleh Samdech Techo Hun Sen, PM Kamboja pada Januari 2022, dan oleh HE Mr. Prak Sokhonn, Wakil Perdana Menteri dan Menteri Luar Negeri dan Kerjasama Internasional Kamboja sebagai Utusan Khusus Ketua ASEAN untuk Myanmar pada bulan Maret dan akhir Juni hingga awal Juli 2022. ASEAN sangat kecewa dengan sedikit kemajuan dan kurangnya komitmen Myanmar untuk implementasi dari Konsensus Lima Poin. ASEAN menegaskan kembali komitmennya terhadap perdamaian dan stabilitas di kawasan dan menyatakan kesiapan ASEAN membantu Myanmar dengan cara positif, damai dan konstruktif. ASEAN juga menyambut baik kunjungan pertama Dr. Noeleen Heyzer sebagai Utusan Khusus Sekretaris Jenderal PBB untuk Myanmar pada Agustus 2022, dan menegaskan peran penting PBB, ASEAN dan mitra eksternal dalam memfasilitasi Solusi damai di Myanmar. ASEAN mendukung peninjauan dan keputusan pemimpin ASEAN tentang Implementasi Konsensus Lima Poin. Kunjungan ketiga Utusan Khusus Ketua ASEAN untuk Myanmar akan membawa kemajuan positif bagi implementasi konsensus lima poin, pengiriman bantuan kemanusiaan dan memperluas kesempatan untuk dialog politik di Myanmar.^{xi}

4. Terselenggaranya KTT ASEAN ke-42 pada tanggal 10-11 Mei 2023 di Labuan Bajo-Indonesia di bawah Keketuaan Indonesia, KTT dipimpin oleh Presiden Joko Widodo. ASEAN tidak mengundang Myanmar pada KTT kali ini.

Menlu Indonesia tidak memberikan pernyataan spesifik terkait alasan Myanmar tidak diundang. Namun berdasarkan pandangan yang di kemukakan oleh salah satu pengamat politik dari Indonesia (Dinna Wisnu, pengamat internasional Universitas Bina

Nusantara) bahwa sikap ASEAN dilatarbelakangi beberapa negara yang tidak mengakui junta militer sebagai pemimpin resmi di Myanmar. KTT ASEAN hanya mengundang para kepala negara anggota ASEAN. Sedangkan Myanmar saat ini dipimpin oleh junta yang notabene saat ini tidak punya legitimasi, bahkan di dalam negeri sekalipun, jadi bukan memojokkan Myanmar tapi realitanya memang Myanmar tidak punya pemimpin.

Poin penting pada KTT ASEAN ke-40 dan ke-41 mengenai perkembangan Myanmar:

Menegaskan kembali posisi ASEAN yang Bersatu bahwa Konsensus Lima Poin tetap menjadi acuan utama ASEAN, ASEAN mendukung keterlibatan ketua yang berkelanjutan dengan semua pemangku kepentingan di Myanmar untuk menemukan solusi damai dan tahan lama untuk menciptakan lingkungan yang kondusif untuk memfasilitasi dialog nasional yang inklusif. ASEAN mendukung Sebagian bantuan kemanusiaan kepada rakyat Myanmar pada 7 Mei 2023 meskipun situasi keamanan menantang. ASEAN mengancam keras serangan terhadap konvoi AHA Center dan Tim Pemantau ASEAN di Negara Bagian Shan. ASEAN sangat prihatin dengan eskalasi konflik bersenjata dan kekerasan di Myanmar. ASEAN mendesak penghentian segera segala bentuk kekerasan untuk menciptakan lingkungan yang kondusif bagi pengiriman bantuan kemanusiaan dan dialog nasional yang inklusif.^{xii}

Menlu Indonesia menyatakan bahwa 5PC ini harus menjadi satu-satunya rujukan keterlibatan ASEAN dengan junta militer di Myanmar dengan kata lain tidak ada trek pendekatan ASEAN selain 5PC untuk menyelesaikan polemik di Myanmar.

Implementasi Kesepakatan Konsensus ASEAN untuk Myanmar

Implementasi terhadap Konsensus Lima Poin meliputi. **Pertama, Rencana kunjungan Utusan Khusus Ketua ASEAN ke Myanmar.** Pada pertemuan ke 54 para Menteri luar negeri ASEAN (*ASEAN Ministerial Meeting/ AMM*) yang berlangsung pada tanggal 2 Agustus 2021 secara virtual yang dipimpin oleh Brunei Darussalam dengan mengusung tema "*We Care, We Prepare, We Prosper*", pada pertemuan tersebut mengangkat isu

regional dan internasional, diantaranya isu perkembangan di Myanmar. ASEAN menyambut baik komitmen Myanmar terhadap Konsensus Lima Poin untuk segera diimplementasikan. ASEAN melalui Sekretaris Jenderal memutuskan menunjuk Menteri Luar Negeri II Brunei Erywan Yusof untuk membantu penyelesaian krisis Myanmar, memfasilitasi dialog politik di Myanmar antara pihak junta dan NLD sebagai upaya mengumpulkan respons terhadap krisis yang semakin meningkat di Myanmar. ASEAN mendorong utusan khusus agar dapat membangun kepercayaan dan keyakinan dengan akses penuh ke semua pihak terkait dan memberikan batas waktu yang jelas mengenai implementasi Konsensus Lima Poin sebelum pertemuan luar negeri ASEAN berikutnya dilaksanakan. Pada AMM ke 54 ini, ASEAN juga mendesak Myanmar untuk segera menyetujui penunjukan utusan khusus serta pelaksanaan konsensus lima poin yang telah disepakati.

Kedua, Kunjungan pertama utusan khusus Ketua ASEAN untuk Myanmar pada 7-8 Januari 2022. Ini merupakan kunjungan pertama di tahun 2022. Perdana Menteri Kerajaan Kamboja Hun Sen bertemu dengan kepala junta Jenderal Min Aung Hlaing di ibu kota Naypyidaw didampingi oleh lima Menteri kabinet Kamboja, wakil panglima tertinggi Angkatan Bersenjata, dua wakil Menteri dan satu tim delegasi.^{xiii} Pertemuan bilateral antara kedua belah pihak membahas sejumlah masalah bilateral dan regional yang menjadi perhatian dan kepentingan bersama, kedua pemimpin saling memberi pengarahannya tentang perkembangan terakhir di negara masing-masing.

Ketiga, Kunjungan kedua tahun 2022 utusan khusus ketua ASEAN untuk Myanmar pada 30 Juni – 02 Juli 2022. Menugaskan HE PRAK Sokhonn, Wakil Perdana Menteri Kamboja yang didampingi oleh sekjen ASEAN, wakil sekjen ASEAN, anggota kantor utusan khusus Ketua ASEAN dan perwakilan dari sekretariat ASEAN. Inti pembahasan dalam kunjungan utusan khusus berdasarkan tiga prioritas kerja yaitu, pengurangan/penghentian kekerasan, penyampaian bantuan kemanusiaan. Tujuan dari kunjungan kedua itu dalam rangka menindaklanjuti pertemuan sebelumnya antara Perdana Menteri Hun Sen dan Jenderal senior, serta mendorong kemajuan

implementasi lima poin yaitu penghentian kekerasan, percepatan pengiriman bantuan kemanusiaan, dan program vaksinasi bersama yang disahkan pada pertemuan konsultasi bantuan kemanusiaan ASEAN ke Myanmar pada 6 Mei 2022 di Phnom Penh serta menciptakan lingkungan yang kondusif untuk dialog politik yang inklusif.^{xiv}

Keempat, Bantuan Kemanusiaan Melalui AHA Center Untuk Myanmar. Pertemuan konsultatif pada 6 Mei 2022 di Phnom Penh Kamboja yang diinisiasi oleh Yang Mulia PRAK Sokhon sebagai Ketua ASEAN tahun 2022 dan Sekjen ASEAN dalam kapasitas sebagai Koordinator Bantuan Kemanusiaan ASEAN (SG-AHAC) merupakan bagian dari pelaksanaan Konsensus Lima Poin. Pertemuan tersebut membahas tiga poin utama, yaitu meliputi:

1. Kerangka Kerja Pengaturan Pengiriman Bantuan Kemanusiaan ASEAN

Berkaitan dengan kerangka kerja pengaturan bantuan kemanusiaan ASEAN di Myanmar, anggota tim yang hadir pada pertemuan setuju bahwa AHA Centre akan bekerja sama dengan Satuan Tugas Myanmar yaitu mengidentifikasi negara bagian atau wilayah dalam rangka mengimplementasikan kerangka kerja dimaksud. serta AHA Center akan memfasilitasi dan memastikan pengiriman bantuan kemanusiaan ke Masyarakat Myanmar termasuk wilayah Etnis Bersenjata.^{xv}

2. Mengatasi Tantangan Operasional Perusahaan Penyaluran Bantuan Kemanusiaan

Sehubungan dengan perlunya mengatasi tantangan operasional yang ditemukan di lapangan, Satgas Myanmar menyetujui melakukan koordinasi dengan pihak-pihak terkait dalam rangka mempercepat pengiriman bantuan kemanusiaan yaitu mendesak AHA Center dan mitra pelaksana untuk menyiapkan dokumen awal yang diperlukan serta memastikan keamanan dan keselamatan staf AHA Center, Tim Pemantau ASEAN dan Tim Satgas.^{xvi}

3. Kerangka Kerja Vaksin COVID-19 Administrasi di Myanmar

Sehubungan dengan usulan kerangka kerja Vaksin COVID-19 di Myanmar, pertemuan tersebut mencatat bahwa kerangka kerja yang diusulkan akan menawarkan ruang bagi para mitra untuk bersama-sama memberikan vaksin COVID-19 kepada warga Myanmar yang membutuhkan secara

aman dan tepat waktu. AHA Center akan melakukan konsultasi terlebih dahulu dengan Kementerian Kesehatan Myanmar, sehubungan dengan identifikasi dan verifikasi negara bagian dan wilayah di Myanmar yang membutuhkan dosis vaksin COVID-19 serta implementasi mitra dalam rangka mendukung distribusi pemberian vaksin di Myanmar.

I. Komitmen Myanmar terhadap Konsensus 5 Poin

No	Utusan Khusus ASEAN	Respon Myanmar (Hasil Pertemuan)
1.	Rencana kunjungan Menteri Luar Negeri II Brunei Erywan Yusof	Junta menolak permintaan Utusan Khusus untuk bertemu pemimpin NLD Aung San Suu Kyi dan para pemimpin lain yang sebelumnya telah diusulkan ke pihak junta militer atas permintaan utusan khusus dalam rencana kunjungannya. Selain tidak menyetujui kunjungan utusan ASEAN dan menolak permintaan utusan khusus untuk bertemu dengan pemimpin NLD, Junta Myanmar juga tidak akan menerapkan konsensus lima poin yang telah disepakati oleh semua negara anggota ASEAN pada 24 April 2021 sampai dengan Myanmar dapat membangun "stabilitas" di Myanmar. ^{xvi}
2.	Kunjungan PM Kamboja Hun Sen (7-8 Januari 2022)	Jenderal Senior Min Aung Hlaing menyampaikan beberapa hal, (1) perkembangan di Myanmar bahwa pemerintah Myanmar telah mendeklarasikan gencatan senjata lima bulan dengan semua Organisasi Bersenjata Etnis (EAO) hingga akhir Februari 2022 dan memutuskan untuk memperpanjang hingga akhir 2022; (2) pimpinan junta meminta semua pihak terkait untuk menerima gencatan senjata demi kepentingan negara dan rakyat, mengakhiri semua tindakan kekerasan dan menahan diri sepenuhnya. Berkaitan dengan gencatan senjata, pimpinan junta menyambut partisipasi utusan khusus Ketua ASEAN untuk bergabung dalam pembicaraan gencatan senjata dengan dan di antara EAO. ^{xvii} Pada prinsipnya pimpinan junta berjanji mendukung dalam memenuhi mandat ASEAN untuk mengimplementasikan konsensus lima poin sesuai dengan Piagam ASEAN.
3.	HE PRAK Sokhonn, Wakil Perdana Menteri Kamboja, sekjen ASEAN, wakil sekjen ASEAN, anggota kantor utusan khusus Ketua ASEAN dan perwakilan dari sekretariat ASEAN (30 Juni-02 Juli 2022)	Kunjungan diterima oleh Jenderal Min Aung Hlaing di Naypyitaw dan dihadiri oleh Ketua Dewan Administrasi Negara (SAC), Ketua Satuan Tugas Myanmar untuk Bantuan Kemanusiaan ASEAN Bersama dengan Menteri Kesehatan dan Menteri Kesejahteraan Sosial. Pertemuan para pihak saling bertukar pandangan tentang pembaruan situasional dan tantangan serta membahas tentang bantuan kemanusiaan Myanmar untuk ASEAN. Utusan khusus juga mengangkat terkait situasi terkini keamanan di Myanmar termasuk kekerasan, kebrutalan dan intimidasi terhadap warga sipil. Jenderal Min Aung Hlaing menginformasikan tentang peningkatan keamanan untuk rakyat dan kesediaannya untuk terlibat langsung dalam perjanjian gencatan senjata nasional, serta menyakinkan utusan khusus atas dukungan penuhnya dalam pemenuhan mandat. ^{xix}
4.	Pertemuan konsultatif di Pnom	Membahas 3 (tiga) poin terkait kerangka pemberian bantuan kemanusiaan melalui AHA Center

	Penh (6 Mei 2023)	
5.	Bantuan Kemanusiaan melalui AHA Center (7 Mei 2023)	Terjadi baku tembak ketika AHA Center menyerahkan bantuan kemanusiaan ke negara Bagian Shan Myanmar.

Tantangan ASEAN dalam Mempromosikan Perdamaian dan HAM di Myanmar

Konsensus Lima Poin yang menjadi kerangka acuan bagi ASEAN dalam rangka mengatasi krisis keamanan dan krisis kemanusiaan di Myanmar tidak membuahkan hasil. Junta Myanmar tidak menunjukkan keinginan untuk melaksanakan atau bekerja sama dengan rencana perdamaian yang disepakati ASEAN untuk Myanmar pada April 2021. Meskipun Myanmar menyetujuinya dalam pertemuan para pemimpin negara Asia Tenggara, Myanmar jauh dari menghormati kesepakatan yang telah di buat bersama. Junta tetap meningkatkan kekerasan untuk menekan pertentangan publik yang meluas terhadap kekuasaannya. Sehubungan dengan peran ASEAN sebagai salah satu organisasi internasional, penulis mengutip teori Clive Archer dalam bukunya yang berjudul "*Internasional Organisations*", di mana Archer menjelaskan peran organisasi internasional, antara lain bertindak sebagai instrument, arena dan aktor. ASEAN sebagai organisasi internasional di kawasan telah melakukan berbagai langkah antara lain diplomasi baik bilateral, multilateral maupun regional, merumuskan perjanjian-perjanjian, merumuskan kesepakatan dalam rangka mengakomodir kepentingan negara anggotanya untuk mencapai kepentingan negara anggotanya.

Keselarasn dengan organisasi internasional dan kerja sama internasional, penulis menggunakan perspektif neoliberalisme. Mendasarkan teori yang disampaikan oleh Vinsensio Dugis (2018), bahwa neoliberalisme hadir mengisi ruang "kegagalan" neorealisme yang sama sekali tidak memprediksi bahwa Perang Dingin dapat berakhir secara damai. Neoliberalisme berkembang melalui teori-teori yang mengkaji tentang pentingnya kerja sama internasional, bahwa organisasi internasional sebagai media kerja sama negara dalam rangka mencapai stabilitas dan perdamaian internasional. Neoliberalisme percaya bahwa kerjasama antar negara adalah mungkin dan dapat

difasilitasi melalui lembaga-lembaga internasional. Lembaga-lembaga ini dapat mengurangi ketidakpastian dan meningkatkan transparansi serta kepercayaan antar negara.

Lembaga/organisasi internasional dipandang sebagai sebuah alat sekaligus aktor dan menjadi jembatan antar negara dalam melakukan kerja sama mencapai situasi damai, meskipun dalam prakteknya akan muncul konflik dalam kerja sama antar negara, namun organisasi internasional mempunyai tugas sebagai mediator dan pengawas dalam suatu hubungan antar negara. Menanggapi isu Myanmar, ASEAN telah menyepakati Konsensus Lima Poin/5PC sebagai referensi utama dalam mengatasi krisis di Myanmar. Lima poin yang dimaksud adalah (1) penghentian aksi kekerasan, (2) penyelenggaraan dialog konstruktif antara semua pihak terkait untuk mencari solusi damai, (3) pembentukan utusan khusus ASEAN untuk memfasilitasi proses dialog dan mediasi, (4) pengiriman bantuan kemanusiaan, dan (5) kunjungan utusan khusus ke Myanmar.

ASEAN sebagai organisasi regional mengemban tugas dalam mencari solusi untuk membantu mengatasi krisis yang terjadi di Myanmar. ASEAN menjadi harapan sebagai mediator untuk menyelesaikan konflik di Myanmar. Komunitas internasional juga telah berharap penuh pada ASEAN sebagai pihak utama yang bisa merumuskan solusi atas segala krisis yang terjadi dan mendorong tindakan aktif ASEAN dalam menemukan solusi damai di Myanmar, karena keterlibatan suatu institusi internasional dalam mengatasi konflik baik domestik maupun antar negara dan memberikan pengaruh terhadap perdamaian antar negara, namun dalam prakteknya ASEAN sebagai organisasi internasional tidak dapat menerapkan pola kerja sama untuk menyelesaikan isu Myanmar. Dimana komitmen ASEAN dalam upaya penyelesaian krisis kemanusiaan di Myanmar kembali dipertanyakan usai *retreat* Konferensi Tingkat Tinggi (KTT) ASEAN ke-43 di Jakarta, 4 September 2023, dalam pertemuan yang ditujukan untuk meninjau ulang implementasi 5PC. Junta militer menolak menerapkan 5PC dan tampaknya sulit untuk mengharapkan ada perkembangan berarti dalam resolusi konflik. Selain terbelenggu prinsip dasar untuk tidak mencampuri urusan dalam negeri negara anggotanya, negara anggota ASEAN juga belum semua bersuara bulat

terhadap isu Myanmar sejak kudeta militer. Sehingga mekanisme penyelesaian konflik Myanmar menjadi tidak efektif dan komitmen terhadap prinsip non intervensi juga mengakibatkan terbatasnya pergerakan ASEAN dalam melakukan intervensi terhadap Myanmar, sehingga pola kerja sama internasional antar negara tidak dapat menjadi kerangka acuan bagi Myanmar untuk mengatasi konflik secara berkelanjutan.

Kesimpulan

Myanmar negara berkembang di Asia Tenggara dengan kesejarahan panjang konflik antar etnis, sistem pemerintahan otoriter di bawah rezim militer, dan kudeta militer berulang yang membuat masyarakat Myanmar hidup di bawah kemiskinan, ketertindasan dan terisolasi dari internasional. Tahun 1948-1962, Myanmar berada di bawah sistem pemerintahan demokrasi parlementer, sejak tahun 1962-1990 Myanmar dalam kekuasaan rezim militer. Tahun 1988 terjadi gerakan pro demokrasi dan unjuk rasa dalam skala besar oleh mahasiswa, masyarakat sipil dan para biksu buddha yang menolak kekuasaan militer, gerakan ini menghasilkan ketidakstabilan regional, atas desakan masyarakat dan dunia internasional, Myanmar melakukan transisi demokrasi. Pemilu pertama dilaksanakan tahun 1990, dimenangkan partai NLD (partai pendukung demokrasi), pemilu damai tidak terlaksana dan terjadi kudeta militer, tahun 2010 pemilu kembali terlaksana dimenangkan oleh partai USDP (partai bentukan militer), pemilu berikutnya tahun 2015 dimenangkan NLD dengan pemimpin yang dibatalkan karena tidak sesuai dengan aturan dalam konstitusi 2008, 5 tahun kemudian tepatnya pada 8 November 2020 pemilu kembali dilaksanakan, dimenangkan oleh partai NLD namun tidak diakui oleh partai oposisi (militer) karena dianggap banyak kecurangan sehingga terjadi kudeta. Kepemimpinan Myanmar diambil alih junta militer, militer menahan para pemimpin NLD, mengumumkan keadaan darurat selama 1 tahun kedepan dalam rangka menjaga stabilitas negara dan berjanji akan melaksanakan pemilu demokratis setelah keadaan stabil. Pasca kudeta militer, terjadi unjuk rasa oleh massa pro demokrasi yang di tanggapi militer dengan

tindak kekerasan dan penembakan secara brutal kepada masyarakat sipil.

Negara-negara di kawasan dan dunia internasional prihatin, mengancam bahkan mengutuk tindakan junta militer yang mengambil alih kekuasaan dan melakukan tindak kekerasan dan kesewenang-wenangan terhadap masyarakat sipil Myanmar yang menuntut dikembalikannya kekuasaan *de facto*. ASEAN sebagai organisasi regional, menjadi forum bagi negara-negara di kawasan Asia Tenggara ikut bertanggung jawab atas isu politik dan krisis kemanusiaan di Myanmar. ASEAN secara cepat merespon atas isu Myanmar dan segera melakukan berbagai upaya dalam mengatasi krisis politik keamanan dan kemanusiaan yang terjadi di Myanmar. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi ASEAN segera diselenggarakan pasca kudeta, dimana para pemimpin negara-negara anggota melakukan pertemuan darurat pada 24 April 2021 dan di hadiri oleh semua pemimpin negara anggota ASEAN termasuk junta militer, hasil dari pertemuan tersebut telah disepakatinya Konsensus Lima Poin sebagai langkah ASEAN dalam mengatasi konflik Myanmar. **Isi dari Konsensus Lima Poin antara lain** (1) kekerasan di Myanmar harus segera dihentikan dan semua pihak harus menahan diri sepenuhnya; (2) dialog konstruktif di antara semua pihak terkait harus dimulai untuk mencari Solusi damai demi kepentingan rakyat; (3) utusan khusus Ketua ASEAN akan memfasilitasi mediasi proses dialog, dengan bantuan Sekretaris Jenderal ASEAN; (4) ASEAN akan memberikan bantuan kemanusiaan melalui AHA Centre; (5) utusan dan delegasi khusus akan mengunjungi Myanmar untuk bertemu dengan semua pihak terkait.

Belum ada kemajuan signifikan dari implementasi Lima Poin Konsensus ASEAN untuk penyelesaian krisis Myanmar, junta militer menolak melaksanakan isi dari 5PC sampai dengan Myanmar dapat membangun stabilitas di Myanmar. Kesatuan dan kekompakan organisasi internasional ASEAN dibutuhkan untuk merumuskan langkah-langkah kedepan, 5PC tetap menjadi acuan dalam penyelesaian krisis di Myanmar, tetap menghormati prinsip non intervensi, kepatuhan terhadap supremasi hukum, tata pemerintahan yang baik, prinsip-prinsip demokrasi dan pemerintahan konstitusional. ASEAN terus berupaya agar ada langkah maju mendorong implementasi 5PC

melalui keterlibatan dengan berbagai pihak, mendorong terciptanya dialog yang inklusif kemudian menyerukan penghentian kekerasan dan memfasilitasi penyelesaian lewat *joint assessment* melalui AHA Center. Persoalan Myanmar tidak boleh menjadi hambatan bagi ASEAN untuk melanjutkan agenda lain berkaitan dengan percepatan pembangunan komunitas ASEAN.

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Implementation of REDD+ Program as a Strategic Climate Diplomacy Instrument: Political Interests of Indonesia (2014–2024)

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ABSTRACT

Indonesia, as the country with the third largest tropical forest area in the world, plays an important role through the implementation of the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) program. REDD+ serves as Indonesia's strategic climate diplomacy tool in addressing climate change. This study uses an institutional neoliberalism theoretical framework to understand how international institutions and multilateral cooperation mechanisms operate. The research method used is descriptive qualitative with data collection through literature studies and documentation from official sources. The results of the study show the process and efforts to strengthen institutions to support the implementation of REDD+. REDD+ demonstrates Indonesia's climate diplomacy capacity, enabling Indonesia to obtain financial support from international donors, thereby strengthening the Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) system and empowering local communities. This study found that climate diplomacy through REDD+ strengthens Indonesia's bargaining position in international forums and makes a tangible contribution to national emissions reduction and the promotion of sustainable development. Overall, REDD+ has become a vital foreign and domestic policy instrument in aligning global and national interests in addressing the threat of climate change.

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Introduction

Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the world with the third largest tropical forest area, reflecting that Indonesia is facing high risks due to climate change and that Indonesia's population is in a strategic position in global climate negotiations. Indonesia has been actively involved in international forums on climate change since the 1990s, continuously striving to balance national development interests with

global emission mitigation demands (Gaora et al., 2023). Indonesia has been greatly affected by climate change through various phenomena such as sea level rise, hydrometeorological disasters, and increasingly frequent forest fires in various places. Therefore, Indonesia now urgently needs to prioritize climate change efforts that could threaten food security and cause a decline in economic growth, which will continue to worsen if climate change is not addressed immediately.

Amidst the urgency of addressing climate change, Indonesia continues to strive to develop and identify significant efforts. REDD is one of Indonesia's efforts to mitigate climate change, with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to protect and assist in sustainable forest management. This program not only focuses on reducing emissions but also includes forest carbon conservation through sustainable forest management and continuous improvement of forest carbon reserves (Indarto, et al., 2012). The Indonesian government has ratified Law No. 6 of 1994, which officially binds Indonesia to international obligations and entitles it to support and opportunities in achieving the objectives of the convention. Indonesia's involvement in the global climate began when Indonesia, specifically Bali, hosted the COP-13 Conference in 2007, which resulted in Indonesian forests being placed as a key element, especially in the development of the REDD+ scheme (Gaora et al., 2023). Climate change Through REDD+ as an instrument of climate diplomacy mitigation has a significant influence due to its effectiveness in targeting significant sources of emissions. REDD+ is also considered more cost-effective when compared to efforts in other sectors because the cost of maintaining and restoring forests is lower than investing in technology in other sectors. (Seymour & Busch, 2016). The forestry and land use sectors play a major role in national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, with 60% of emissions coming from deforestation and forest degradation. (Seymour & Busch, 2016)

During 2014-2024, implementation in Indonesia faced various challenges such as cross-sector coordination, complex governance, dependence on external funding, and the need for law enforcement in Indonesia. The issue of climate change continues to be a top priority both nationally and internationally, as can be seen from the various policies and efforts that have been introduced. Indonesia remains strongly committed to climate change efforts, such as strengthening the Paris Agreement and REDD+ diplomacy, which are among the main focuses with great potential in climate change. In the context of climate diplomacy during Jokowi's leadership, various initiatives have been undertaken to strengthen Indonesia's position in the international arena, including the G20, which invited world leaders to visit the mangrove forests in Bali. This reflects national and international efforts to mitigate

climate change. Despite significant progress, there are still various obstacles in utilizing REDD+ as an instrument in climate diplomacy (Astuti & McGregor, 2015). The success of the REDD+ program is considered to be highly dependent on the participation of the national community and the recognition of the national community. This has led to several conflicts between indigenous peoples and other parties that could hinder the implementation of the REDD+ program.

The implementation of the REDD+ program in Indonesia faces various significant challenges and obstacles. This can cause disruptions in the implementation of the program at the local level, but it will also greatly affect Indonesia's position in international climate diplomacy. Indonesia often receives criticism for not doing enough to achieve these goals and for not fully implementing the process. Many parties believe that Indonesia's commitment is still normative and has not been fully realized in concrete steps in the field. The ambitious target of reducing emissions by 29% to 41% by 2030, for example, is considered to be unsupported by a clear and measurable blueprint and action plan. The inconsistency between mitigation policies and the direction of national development is also evident in the government's program to increase electricity capacity by 35,000 MW, which still largely relies on coal, while the target of increasing the share of new and renewable energy to 23 percent by 2025 is still far from being realized, having only reached around 9 percent due to minimal investment in this sector. (Gaora et al., 2023). According to the Climate Action Tracker (CAT), Indonesia's climate change policies are still considered "Highly Insufficient" and Indonesia's climate change diplomacy in the global context is declining and invisible. (Djalal, 2021).

One of the obstacles in its implementation is the complexity of governance and coordination between institutions because REDD+ involves many actors such as ministries, government agencies, and other non-state actors (Indarto et al., 2012). Data from CIFOR shows that around 40% of REDD++ projects experience delays due to a complex bureaucratic system and a lack of coordination between policy-making institutions. Legal certainty and conflicts over land rights are common problems in the REDD+ program process, where it is noted that many forest areas overlap with customary rules that have not been officially ratified and recognized,

ultimately causing legal uncertainty that hinders the REDD+ program process. According to a 2020 report by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK), Indonesia has approximately 94.1 million hectares of forest, consisting of primary, secondary, and conservation forests. (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2020) However, there are indications of overlap in the implementation of the REDD+ program. In addition, data from the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning (ATR/BPN) identifies that around 77.3 million hectares of forest land have overlapping permits, such as mining, plantation, and forest area loan permits. This reflects that the complexity of forest management is now a major obstacle in the implementation of the REDD+ program. (Forest Digest Madani, 2023).

East Kalimantan Province is the main jurisdiction for the World Bank-supported REDD+ program and is also facing increasing deforestation. In 2023, deforestation nearly doubled from 79,200 hectares in 2022 to 161,000 hectares in 2023, largely due to the expansion of oil palm plantations (Bulletin, 2024). Central Kalimantan Province has a forest area of approximately 13.12 million hectares, or 85.72% of the province's land area, and also faces challenges in forest management, especially in the 3 million hectares of peatland that serves as a carbon sink (Bappeddalitbang Kalteng, 2003). The overlapping permits and exploitative activities in this region require serious attention in climate change mitigation efforts..

Transparency and accountability in the management of REDD+ funds are serious challenges in determining the success of this program. REDD+ funds come from bilateral and multilateral donors, the private sector, and the government, and must be managed properly and transparently. However, several reports indicate that the management of REDD+ funds in Indonesia still faces many obstacles. Seymour and Busch (2016) state that only around 25-30% of REDD+ funds can be accounted for transparently at the local level. This lack of clarity in reporting not only raises doubts among international donors, but also caused a delay in the disbursement of funds from Norway in 2021, indicating that the monitoring and reporting system is still inadequate (Busch, 2016). Indonesia has received results-based financing (RBP) incentives from the REDD+ program, which has great potential to support climate change mitigation. Robert Keohane asserts that international institutions can

reduce uncertainty, mediate interests, and create common rules that enable countries to address collective problems (Keohane, 1984).

However, the success of this mechanism is highly dependent on the effectiveness of institutions in creating transparency, accountability, and fair distribution of benefits. In implementing the REDD+ program in Indonesia, significant challenges arise from economic and political pressures that affect the effectiveness of climate change mitigation efforts. Indonesia faces a dilemma between maintaining high economic growth and preserving the environment, particularly tropical forests, which contribute significantly to greenhouse gas emissions due to deforestation. The expansion of extractive sectors, such as oil palm plantations and mining, continues to be a major driver of deforestation, which is contrary to the objectives of REDD+. According to Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia. (WALHI, 2024). Although REDD+ aims to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, economic pressures to clear new land to meet demand for palm oil and mineral exports have kept deforestation rates high. This creates a complex dilemma, where short-term economic development efforts often sacrifice long-term conservation, leading to conflicts of interest between the economic and environmental sectors.

The implementation of REDD+ can also have a negative impact on local economies that depend on forests. When forests are left to grow naturally without intervention, community access to forest resources becomes limited, halting economic activities that depend on forests. This raises concerns that strict implementation of REDD+ could lead to economic decline at the local and national levels, triggering social and political resistance. Furthermore, the rise in commodity prices since the mid-2000s has increased competition for land, making the implementation of REDD+ more expensive and complex. (Indriatmoko, 2013) Market pressures and economic investment needs make it difficult for governments and businesses to prioritize forest conservation over economic expansion. This situation worsened due to the 2008 global financial crisis, which shifted the focus from climate change to macroeconomic issues. However, carbon trading mechanisms and results-based payments (RBP) in the REDD+ program open up new economic opportunities for local communities through the development of non-timber

forest products and social forestry. The success of these initiatives depends on the sustainability of accurate carbon emissions recording and reporting, which is still in the development stage in Indonesia.

The dilemma between economic development and environmental conservation is a major challenge in the implementation of REDD+. Policies are needed that balance both interests, strengthen forest governance, and increase local community participation. This step also strengthens Indonesia's climate diplomacy by demonstrating a commitment to reducing emissions without sacrificing sustainable economic development. Thus, climate change is a global urgency that requires immediate action because its impacts continue to increase. Indonesia is using REDD+ as an instrument of climate diplomacy for the period 2014–2024, making this issue a national and international priority in the form of international cooperation facilitated by global institutions and driven by a shared interest in tackling climate change. However, the implementation of REDD+ diplomacy has not yet fully met expectations, as it still faces various challenges and obstacles, particularly in terms of the effectiveness of Indonesia's climate diplomacy. This study aims to examine the role of REDD+ in Indonesia's climate diplomacy and identify the opportunities and obstacles faced. With a deep understanding of these opportunities and challenges, this study is expected to provide strategic insights for Indonesia's climate diplomacy in an increasingly complex and sustainability-oriented global order.

Literature Review

Theory of Diplomacy

According to Berridge, diplomacy is a process that involves negotiation, persuasion, and representation between countries and international actors. Diplomacy is not only formal meetings or exchanges of diplomatic notes, but also building trust and legitimacy in the international community. The success of diplomacy depends on a country's ability to articulate its national interests effectively, establish open communication, and create a positive perception among global stakeholders. Trust is built through transparency, consistency, and fulfillment of commitments, while legitimacy is

gained when a country is seen as credible, responsible, and contributing positively to the common good. On environmental issues, legitimacy is important for accessing international support, funding, and partnerships. (Berridge, 2010)

In the context of global environmental issues, such as climate change, diplomacy has become increasingly complex and requires cross-sectoral negotiation expertise. Environmental issues are no longer solely a technical domain, but have become part of a strategic foreign policy agenda. In this context, climate diplomacy is not just a matter of ordinary bilateral or multilateral negotiations, but involves intensive and inclusive coordination between various actors with different interests, capacities, and responsibilities. Countries, including Indonesia, must be able to combine domestic interests with international demands and expectations through diplomacy. Berridge (2010) highlights that environmental diplomacy requires efforts to build consensus, strengthen coalitions, and manage differences in interests constructively in order to achieve sustainable joint solutions. (Berridge, 2010).

Climate diplomacy is a branch of environmental diplomacy that focuses on negotiations, cooperation, and relations between countries in addressing global climate change issues. Climate diplomacy is a very important field in global governance, where the global environment must be taken seriously in facing the challenges of climate change. In an article by Gianna Gayle Herrera Amul and Maxim Shrestha (2015) entitled *Cities and Climate Diplomacy in The Asia-Pacific*, they explain three main conditions for climate diplomacy to work well, including: (AMUL & SHRESTHA, 2015):

1. Climate diplomacy must involve interactions between actors that transcend political boundaries, meaning not only countries but also non-state actors such as NGOs, the private sector, and civil society
2. These actors have an interest in maintaining their strategic positions in global climate governance

These interests are aimed at gaining influence in global decision-making on climate issues. This shows that climate diplomacy is a multidimensional arena of negotiation involving various actors with different interests.

Methods

This research method is qualitative with a descriptive approach to understand the implementation of the REDD+ program as an instrument of Indonesian climate diplomacy. The data used is secondary data from books, journals, policy documents, government reports, and publications from international institutions related to REDD+ and climate diplomacy. Data collection was carried out through literature and documentation studies, by examining scientific literature, official documents, archives, annual reports, statistical data, agreement results, and program evaluations. Additional observations were made through monitoring official media and government publications. In addition, observations of the phenomenon of REDD+ policy development and implementation were monitored through official media and government publications to supplement the data.

Data analysis was conducted inductively by reducing, summarizing, and identifying important themes and patterns, which were then presented in a systematic descriptive narrative. Data validity was maintained through triangulation by comparing various sources and retesting the research objects and library references. The research instruments consisted of library study guidelines and systematic documentation focused on topics and key questions to guide the data collection and analysis process in accordance with the research focus, thereby producing an analysis that was objective, comprehensive, and relevant to the research objectives. Thus, this research design prioritizes a descriptive qualitative approach through consolidated secondary data collection, in-depth analysis, and rigorous validation, thereby providing a comprehensive overview and understanding of the role and contribution of the REDD+ program in Indonesia's climate diplomacy during the 2014–2024 period.

Result and Discussion

Result

The implementation of REDD+ in Indonesia (2014–2024) has significantly changed the role of climate diplomacy both nationally and internationally. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed a Climate Diplomacy Task Force to

integrate climate issues into foreign policy and strengthen Indonesia's negotiating position in multilateral forums. The formation of the Climate Diplomacy Task Force is an important step in consolidating Indonesia's position in the international arena. This institution serves as the spearhead in coordinating climate negotiation strategies that integrate climate change issues into all foreign policies. With the existence of this task force, Indonesia has adopted a structured and proactive approach to climate diplomacy, enabling it to deal with the complexity of global negotiations that demand inclusive and results-based multilateral diplomacy.

Indonesia has established strategic partnerships with international donors, such as a Letter of Intent with Norway worth USD 1 billion, providing concrete evidence of how climate diplomacy works through funding, technology transfer, and forestry policy reform. These bilateral relationships provide a strategic context for Indonesia to mobilize resources and technical capacity to meet verifiable and measurable emission reduction targets. Although this partnership ended due to differences in principles, Indonesia's climate diplomacy remains adaptive and sustainable, demonstrating maturity and independence in responding to global political dynamics while maintaining its commitment to the Paris Agreement and the sustainable development agenda. This cooperation enhances Indonesia's credibility in implementing the REDD+ program and strengthens its position in climate diplomacy. (Astuti & McGregor, 2015)

Indonesia has consistently been active in international forums such as the UNFCCC, COP, G20, and ASEAN, demonstrating a consistent diplomatic focus on promoting the country's position as a “forest superpower.” Its position as the country with the third largest tropical forest area in the world gives it strong leverage to play a bridge-building role that connects the global mitigation agenda with national development needs. The hosting of COP-13 in Bali in 2007 was a historic moment that cemented Indonesia's reputation in climate diplomacy, strengthening its credibility and vision in driving the issue of forests as a key element in climate change negotiations.

Indonesia's climate change diplomacy is being strengthened through the integration of national policies, particularly the synchronization of the REDD+ strategy with the 2019-2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan

(RPJMN) and the 2030 FOLU Net Sink Target. This synergy indicates that climate change diplomacy does not only depend on political narratives or verbal commitments, but is also manifested in concrete and systematic domestic policies. The multidimensional approach involves central and regional government actors, indigenous peoples, NGOs, and the business world, which strengthens transparency and accountability-based governance, a vital component for building international trust and legitimacy. This shows that Indonesia is capable of delivering climate change diplomacy that is not only responsive but also progressive in the context of sustainable development. Indonesia's climate change diplomacy is reflected in the COVID-19 pandemic, which has tested the capacity for coordination and innovation in climate change mitigation mechanisms.

The use of digital technology and online methods in the implementation of REDD+ during the pandemic symbolizes the adaptation of Indonesia's climate diplomacy, which remains productive and relevant, maintaining the continuity of emission reduction programs despite being constrained by uncertain global conditions (Wong, 2022). A multidimensional approach involving various actors, ranging from central and local governments, indigenous peoples, NGOs, to the private sector, helps strengthen transparent and accountable program governance, particularly through the development of Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) and Safeguard Information System (SIS) in accordance with IPCC standards (Gaora et al., 2023).

Discussion

Climate Change Diplomacy Through The Implementation Of Redd+ Indonesia

The 2014-2016 Indonesian REDD+ Program entered an initial consolidation phase that strengthened climate diplomacy and greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. This phase is marked by several important achievements, including the receipt of USD 103.8 million in Results-Based Payments (RBP) from the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the strengthening of bilateral cooperation with Norway through a USD 1 billion Letter of Intent (LoI), and the reaffirmation of commitments under the Paris Agreement. (Green Climate Fund Task Force, 2020).

Bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and Norway through a Letter of Intent (LoI) signed in 2010 worth USD 1 billion added a strategic dimension to Indonesia's climate diplomacy. This cooperation focuses on results-based financing, technology transfer, and forestry policy reform that results in improved forest governance and more effective deforestation management (Astuti & McGregor, 2015).

Based on the REDD+ Monitoring and Evaluation (Monev) report for Indonesia for the period 2014-2016, Indonesia became the first country in the Asia-Pacific region to receive results-based funding (Results-Based Payment/RBP) from the GCF amounting to USD 103.8 million in return for reducing emissions by 20.25 million tons of CO₂e in the 2014-2016 period. This funding is an important milestone in proving Indonesia's credibility in managing the REDD+ program transparently and accountably, while strengthening the country's climate diplomacy position in international forums. The funding was allocated to support three main components that play a strategic role in Indonesia's climate change diplomacy. First, strengthening coordination and developing a national REDD+ program architecture that enables policy integration and cross-sectoral synchronization. Second, strengthening sustainable forest governance through the development of Forest Management Units (KPH) and village forests, which strengthen the participation of local communities and the adoption of sustainable management practices. Third, implementing conservation, land rehabilitation, and forest fire control, which directly contribute to reducing emissions while maintaining ecosystem stability.

Table. Management of REDD+ RBP Funds for the 2014-2016 Period

No	Output	Budget (USD)
1	Strengthening Coordination and Implementation of REDD+ and the Overall REDD+ Architecture (Enabling Conditions)	9,40 million
2	Support for sustainable forest governance, to support sustainable forest management by expanding and improving the implementation of Social Forestry (PS), development of forest management units (KPH), forest and land rehabilitation, fire control and ensuring sustainable livelihoods	93,40 Million
3	Project management	0,98 Million
TOTAL		103,78 Million

Source: RBP RED For Result Period 2014-2016 GCF

Technically, Indonesia has succeeded in strengthening the architecture of its national REDD+ program by focusing on the development of a transparent and credible monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) system. The systems developed, such as the Forest Reference Emission Level (FREL), the National Forest Monitoring System (NFMS), and the Safeguards Information System (SIS), support the measurement and reporting of auditable emissions (UNDP, 2022). Its involvement in results-based payments proves that Indonesia is capable of playing a central role as a “forest superpower” with strategic interests in global climate mitigation and domestic sustainable development. This achievement strengthens Indonesia's position as a strategic “forest superpower” in climate diplomacy, which blends global emission reduction interests with sustainable national development, recognition of indigenous peoples' rights, and local empowerment. Transparent and accountable implementation of REDD+ also builds global trust in Indonesia's commitment, opening up opportunities for broader bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Indonesia strengthened its climate diplomacy and synchronized national policies, which are crucial in supporting Indonesia's foreign interests through the REDD+ program. During this period, Indonesia further solidified its position as a strategic actor on the international stage through its active participation in various key multilateral forums such as the Conference of Parties (COP) under the UNFCCC, the G20 forum, ASEAN, and other multilateral mechanisms. Indonesia's climate change diplomacy during this period highlighted REDD+ as the main mitigation instrument used to advocate for forest-based sustainability policies and investments, natural resources that are Indonesia's main assets in facing the global climate crisis. Its position as the country with the third largest tropical forest area in the world gives Indonesia strong leverage to play a role as a bridge-builder connecting global and national interests in climate change mitigation, while strengthening its bargaining power in international negotiations. (Gaora et al., 2023)

Indonesia continues to strengthen governance through the development of a more transparent and accountable national MRV system by developing spatial information systems such as SIMONELA and SIMONTANA that support accurate deforestation monitoring. Within the

regulatory framework, Regulation of the Minister of Environment and Forestry No. P.70 of 2017 provides a legal basis for the REDD+ implementation mechanism regarding REDD+ Implementation Procedures, Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks. It regulates the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) mechanism and technology-based REDD+ data management that supports the transparency and accountability of the REDD+ program by involving various stakeholders, including local communities. The MRV mechanism includes the formation of an Independent Verification Team and a national registry system (SRN-PPI) as a database for REDD+ management. (Minister of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia, 2017) The alignment of the National Development Policy (RPJMN 2019-2024) with the national REDD+ strategy is an important milestone in this period. The RPJMN sets a target of FOLU (Forestry and Other Land Use) Net Sink 2030, which requires the continuity of REDD+ implementation with the national sustainable development agenda.

The implementation of REDD+ in 2020-2022 highlights adaptive responses to global crisis challenges, the advancement of national strategic policies, and the increased role of climate diplomacy through more integrated and solution-oriented international cooperation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Indonesia's climate change diplomacy continued to be adaptive and innovative despite global restrictions. Based on the 2020 Performance Report of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK), Indonesia has successfully implemented various concrete measures in the REDD+ program that support consistent climate change mitigation commitments. In the same year, the social forestry and forest area redistribution programs continued to be implemented with remarkable achievements, with social forestry permits reaching 409,934 hectares, far exceeding the target. The TORA program also contributed by releasing 72,956 hectares of forest area for local communities. Forest area management improved with an effectiveness index reaching 114.29% of the target, an indication of increasingly structured and professional forest management despite the pandemic limiting physical activities (KLHK, 2021).

In terms of policy, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 98 of 2021, which

regulates the Implementation of Carbon Economic Value (NEK), establishing a framework for carbon trading mechanisms and economic incentives in the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) sector. The implementation of this Presidential Regulation includes a national carbon credit registry scheme (SRN-PPI), the role of independent verification institutions, and the harmonization of reporting standards with the UN-FCCC. This policy enhances the credibility of Indonesia's climate diplomacy on the international stage, expands access to carbon markets and global funding sources. Furthermore, this policy strengthens community and private sector participation in internationally recognized mitigation actions and integrates REDD+ into national mitigation policies (JDIH BPK, 2021).

In September 2021, Indonesia decided to terminate its REDD+ cooperation with Norway because Norway did not realize the RBP payment due to the conditions imposed on Indonesia. One of the conditions imposed, which was considered contrary to Indonesia's national principles, was the evaluation of the Environmental and Forestry Training Center (BDLH), which was regulated in a Presidential Regulation (Puspa, 2021). Therefore, on September 10, 2021, Indonesia decided to terminate the Letter of Intent (LoI) with Norway regarding the REDD+ program. This information was conveyed through a diplomatic note to the Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta. The main reason behind this decision was Norway's lack of progress in implementing results-based payments for emission reductions of 11.2 million tons of CO₂e, which had been verified by international institutions in 2016/2017. However, the termination of this cooperation does not diminish Indonesia's commitment to reducing emissions, as Indonesia remains committed to the Paris Agreement and the sustainable development agenda. Over the past two decades, especially in 2020, Indonesia has experienced an increase in deforestation rates, despite a significant decrease in the area of forest fires. (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021).

Innovations in climate diplomacy during the pandemic were particularly evident in the adaptation of REDD+ implementation methods, especially in the Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) process. A study by CIFOR-ICRAF showed that shifting from face-to-face approaches to online and hybrid methods

for training, monitoring, reporting, and verifying carbon emissions allowed these activities to continue without compromising health protocols. Indonesia emphasizes the importance of strengthening the capacity of relevant parties through online training involving local governments, forest managers, and local communities. The development of digital technology has become an important part of supporting MRV during the pandemic. The use of mobile applications, remote sensing monitoring, and online collaboration tools accelerates data collection and reporting of emissions/emission reductions, thereby maintaining data efficiency and accuracy despite limited field access due to the pandemic. This approach also facilitates the dissemination of information and the involvement of multi-stakeholder networks, including policymakers, academics, and local communities, as part of the benefit-sharing mechanism in REDD+. This shows that even though the pandemic has hampered some physical activities, adaptation through online and hybrid approaches and digital technology has enabled REDD+ to continue effectively and inclusively, supporting Indonesia's commitment to climate change mitigation and sustainable development. (Wong, 2022)

Indonesia's foreign policy role related to REDD+ in 2023-2024 marks a phase of increasingly intensive and strategic evaluation and transformation of climate diplomacy. One of the main achievements is Indonesia's success in obtaining USD 103.8 million in funding from the GCF for the RBP REDD+ program, which began in July 2023 and is planned to run until 2030. The funds will be used to strengthen climate change mitigation in 38 provinces at the local and national levels, including the expansion of social forestry by more than two million hectares, the facilitation of the establishment of customary forests, and the assistance of thousands of forest management work plans and pro-climate locations. This project also focuses on community economic empowerment, forest fire control in vulnerable provinces, and increasing technical capacity for greenhouse gas (GHG) reporting at the national and subnational levels. (KEMENLH, 2025). The importance of this program in climate diplomacy is reflected in the strengthening of the REDD+ Safeguard information system, which was updated in November 2023 with the active participation of various stakeholders. This affirms Indonesia's

commitment to transparency, accountability, and policy harmonization between the central and regional governments, creating solid governance at the subnational level, which is the main foundation for the credibility of Indonesia's climate diplomacy (Ditjen PPI, 2024).

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Indonesia strengthened cooperation by updating the REDD+ Security Information Summary (SIS) document in November 2023 for the second time, involving input from various stakeholders. This reflects the strengthening of governance at the subnational level as a key focus, including policy alignment and improved coordination between central and regional governments, as well as the contribution of all stakeholders in achieving FOLU sector emission reduction performance. (Directorate General of PPI, 2024). The diplomatic strategy adopted encourages Indonesia to become a global leader in REDD+ management, particularly within the framework of South-South Cooperation through the 2024 South-South Exchange (SSE) event in Balikpapan. This event brings together various tropical countries with similar experiences to exchange knowledge and accelerate REDD+-based climate mitigation actions. SSE 2024 not only supports Indonesia's bilateral and multilateral diplomacy but also strengthens its position as a geography of climate leadership that connects developing countries in global climate action (KLHK Communication, 2024). The transformation of climate diplomacy strategy strengthens the synergy between the national agenda and results-based global funding mechanisms, ensuring the sustainability of emission reductions while supporting the achievement of Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets. (Forest Declaration, 2024) This approach demonstrates Indonesia's maturity in balancing domestic interests and international climate diplomacy, including in facing the complex challenges of climate multilateralism today.

Climate Change Diplomacy Strategy Through Redd+ Implementation

In the early stages of REDD+ implementation in Indonesia, the establishment of a special agency known as the REDD+ Special Agency became an important milestone in strengthening Indonesia's climate diplomacy instruments. This agency was established based on Presidential Decree No. 62 of 2013 and is specifically tasked with coordinating all REDD+ related activities at the national level. The functions of this agency include developing national strategies, synchronizing cross-sectoral programs, managing funding, and strengthening institutional capacity, which are critical prerequisites for the success of REDD+ (Saturi, 2015). It also ensures sustainable funding mechanisms such as Result-Based Payment (RBP), which involves major donors including the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Norway, and the World Bank. Through this agency, Indonesia has successfully accessed funds from measurable and accountable emission reductions, while strengthening synergies between the central government, local governments, indigenous peoples, and the private sector. The development of the Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) system and the REDD+ safeguard information system (SIS) has become the foundation of global trust, affirming Indonesia's commitment to strong and standardized governance in its climate diplomacy (SIS REDD+, 2024).

As a next step, Indonesia reviewed and strengthened significant legal and policy frameworks to clarify the rights and obligations of forest resource management, which is the main capital of REDD+. This legislation enforces the law against illegal practices such as illegal logging and opens up space for the recognition of indigenous peoples' rights and the protection of indigenous lands. Improvements to the legal framework also include strengthening land management systems that are oriented towards sustainability and conservation. In addition, Indonesia has integrated MRV protocols in accordance with international standards to improve the transparency and accountability of REDD+ implementation results. These efforts strengthen the legitimacy of REDD+ policies and demonstrate Indonesia's seriousness in complying with its international commitments (Ministry of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023).

The development strategy within this legal framework is implemented by strengthening supervisory and regulatory institutions at the central and regional levels, establishing a National Registry System to record carbon yields, and improving cross-sectoral coordination. Concrete examples include the policy of prohibiting new permits in peatland and primary forest areas to prevent deforestation, and the implementation of RAD-GRK at the provincial and district levels as the basis for regional climate policy. Evaluations show that conservation and rehabilitation programs with a multi-stakeholder approach, including indigenous peoples, local governments, and the private sector, increase the effectiveness of REDD+. This third pillar is key to maintaining sustainable mitigation and building trust between relevant parties, including international donors and the global community in the South-South Exchange and UNFCCC forums (Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, 2024).

Climate change diplomacy is realized through sustainable development strategies focused on the conservation and rehabilitation of forest and peatland areas damaged by deforestation and degradation. Indonesia has successfully expanded protected forest areas such as national parks and nature reserves in East Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Papua, which are important for carbon stocks and habitats for rare species. The BioCF-ISFL project in Jambi is rehabilitating extensive peat ecosystems with a target of reducing emissions by 14 million tons of CO₂e (2020-2025) and USD 70 million in funding. This project combines physical rehabilitation and governance strengthening through the involvement of indigenous communities, recognition of land rights, and preservation of sensitive peat ecosystems. (Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, 2024) This strategy is in line with the 2019-2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) and the 2018-2025 National Strategy for REDD+ (STRANAS REDD+), which target FOLU emissions mitigation and the achievement of a FOLU Net Sink by 2030. Through planned rehabilitation and conservation as well as REDD+ performance-based funding, Indonesia is optimizing sustainable development while significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This implementation also maintains ecological and socio-economic sustainability to prevent resource conflicts that could disrupt environmental and community stability. (Forest Insight, 2024).

Indonesian climate diplomacy strives to strengthen participation through capacity building and environmental leadership education, reflecting systematic efforts to raise public awareness and educate the community on the importance of forest conservation and climate change mitigation. This pillar focuses on formal and non-formal education, awareness campaigns, and the integration of environmental values into national and regional development. The Indonesian government is working to implement community-based outreach to improve the capacity of forest managers and local communities through technical workshops, especially in areas prone to deforestation such as Kalimantan and Sumatra. This training covers sustainable land management, emissions monitoring, and forest conservation techniques supported by CIFOR and international partnership programs. One of the most prominent initiatives is the Green Leadership Indonesia program, which has been developing since 2018. This program systematically trains young people through environmental and climate-themed leadership training, equipping them with critical insights, advocacy skills, and the ability to implement environmentally friendly practices in their home communities. Alumni of this program act as environmental ambassadors who actively promote climate mitigation and forest conservation, which has led to increased awareness and a stronger local environmental culture throughout Indonesia (KLHK Communication, 2024).

During the COVID-19 pandemic since 2020, educational efforts have had to adapt to hybrid and online methods. The implementation of virtual MRV training and workshops has successfully expanded the dissemination of information and capacity across regions and countries. Webinars and online courses have connected hundreds of participants from government, academia, and indigenous communities, strengthening the REDD+ education and advocacy network. (Directorate General of PPI, 2024). Indonesia's implementation of this environmental culture was evident at the 2024 South-South Exchange in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, which served as a forum for knowledge exchange between countries on the implementation of REDD+ and performance-based funding management (RBP). This event demonstrates Indonesia's maturity and success in promoting environmental education as a fundamental part of its climate diplomacy. Through the South-South

Exchange (SSE) 2024, participating countries are expected to improve their comprehensive understanding of REDD+ implementation and integrated REDD+ RBP incentive fund management. The implementation of SSE 2024 aims to increase cross-country capacity by equipping participants with the practical tools and approaches needed to simplify REDD+ initiatives.

Conclusion

The implementation of the REDD+ program as an instrument of Indonesian climate diplomacy for the 2014–2024 period, can be concluded that REDD+ has a strategic role in climate change mitigation and national and global climate diplomacy. This program effectively integrates national interests in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, sustainable forest management, and empowering indigenous and local communities. Through a framework supported by international institutions such as the UN-FCCC and the Green Climate Fund, REDD+ strengthens Indonesia's bargaining position and demonstrates a real commitment to meeting national and international targets, particularly in the context of the 2030 FOLU Net Sink.

The main contribution of this research lies in strengthening the understanding of REDD+ as a key instrument of Indonesia's climate diplomacy that combines climate change mitigation, natural resource conservation, and sustainable development. The study proposes further development in terms of resolving conflicts of interest between economic development and conservation, increasing transparency in fund management, and strengthening the participation of indigenous and local communities so that Indonesia's climate diplomacy is more effective and inclusive. The practical implications of these findings emphasize the need for harmonization of national policies and increased capacity for multilateral diplomacy, in order to make Indonesia a major player in global climate governance.

The limitations of this study are mainly related to the complexity of multi-actor coordination and changing domestic political dynamics, which can directly affect program implementation. In addition, limited field data and changing global conditions such as the COVID-19 pandemic also constrain the analysis. Therefore, future research should focus on empirical studies involving broader stakeholder interviews and

evaluations of socio-economic impacts at the local level, as well as studies on the application of digital technology in MRV management to improve the accountability and effectiveness of REDD+.

Overall, this study underscores the importance of integrating climate diplomacy and domestic policy through the REDD+ program as an innovative and sustainable model for global cooperation, while paving the way for further research to enhance Indonesia's contribution to climate change mitigation and strengthen international environmental diplomacy.

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Rearticulating Indonesia's Foreign Policy Identity in President Prabowo Subianto Discourse on Gaza (2024-2025)

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the rearticulation of Indonesia's foreign policy identity in President Prabowo Subianto's discourse on the Gaza crisis during 2024–2025. Drawing on constructivism, role theory (National Role Conceptions), idiosyncratic leadership, and the two-level games framework with the win-set concept, this article argues that Prabowo's diplomacy represents a shift in Indonesia's identity from a normative solidarity maker toward an affirmative operational peace-keeper. Using a qualitative discourse analysis approach across seven key presidential speeches and a corpus of audience responses, the findings reveal three central dynamics: first, a rearticulation of the nodal point from religious solidarity toward universal anti-colonialism and global humanitarianism; second, a shift in role conception manifested through the offer of 20,000 peacekeeping personnel, the deployment of a hospital ship, and proposed Gaza reconstruction schemes; third, the idiosyncratic dimension of Prabowo's leadership that combines military discipline with multi-alignment diplomacy. Nevertheless, this transformation faces constraints in the form of a narrowing domestic win-set due to resistance from Islamic mass organizations, parliament, and digital public opinion, alongside structural tensions between the role of Palestinian defender and strategic mediator. The study concludes that Prabowo's approach represents an effort to re-stitch the independent and active doctrine to remain relevant in the twenty-first century, preserving the anti-colonial anchor while constructing a more institutional and operational diplomatic architecture.

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1. Introduction

The humanitarian crisis in Gaza following 7 October 2023 placed Indonesia in a diplomatic situation that demanded a response beyond mere statements of solidarity. By the end of 2025, more than 65,000 Palestinian lives had reportedly been lost, the majority of them women and

children, while the United Nations Security Council mechanism repeatedly failed due to the use of veto power by the United States. Within this context, President Prabowo Subianto, who was inaugurated on 20 October 2024, both inherited and challenged a long-standing doctrine: Indonesia's foreign policy identity as an anti-colonial defender of Palestine.

For nearly seven decades, Indonesia's position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has remained relatively stable, anchored by three pillars of identity: the anti-colonial mandate enshrined in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, Mohammad Hatta's independent and active foreign policy doctrine, and the spirit of Asian–African solidarity born from the 1955 Bandung Conference (Sukma, 2003; Acharya, 2016). Only two presidents have ever attempted to substantively renegotiate this position. First, President Abdurrahman Wahid during 1999–2001, through the discourse of limited trade relations with Israel, and later, Prabowo Subianto during 2024–2025, through a combination of operational humanitarian diplomacy and a new rhetoric that conditioned recognition of Israel upon Palestinian sovereignty.

Prabowo's speech at the 80th UN General Assembly on 23 September 2025 marked a discursive turning point. The statement that the international community 'must recognize the State of Palestine, but must also guarantee the safety and security of Israel' became an ambiguous signal for domestic audiences accustomed to the binary opposition between Indonesia–Palestine and Israel. The accompanying commitment of 20,000 peacekeeping personnel, the KRI *dr. Radjiman* hospital ship, and a Gaza reconstruction plan transformed the speech into not merely a symbolic repositioning but also a high-stakes operational commitment.

This study addresses two questions. First, how do President Prabowo's speeches and statements (2024–2025) represent and renegotiate Indonesia's foreign policy identity on the Gaza issue; and second, how do domestic and international audience responses constrain or enable this transformation. These questions are answered through a qualitative discourse analysis approach across seven key speech corpora, complemented by a corpus of public responses from religious mass organizations, parliament, and the media.

This approach addresses gaps in the existing literature, which has tended to treat presidential speeches as supplements to policy analysis rather than as primary data for the production of identity. Accordingly, this study contributes to contemporary Indonesian foreign policy scholarship by offering a systematic reading of identity rearticulation mechanisms during the early period of Prabowo's administration, while

tracing the structural boundaries that shape Indonesia's diplomatic flexibility in the multipolar era.

2. Survey of Key Studies

The literature on Indonesia's foreign policy in the Israeli–Palestinian issue can be mapped into four complementary clusters. The first cluster focuses on normative foundations and historical continuity. Medina et al. (2026) and Muttaqien (2013) emphasize that Indonesia's support for Palestine is a manifestation of an 'ethical identity' rooted in the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila values. Bachtiar et al. (2021) trace the thoughts of Soekarno, Wahid, and Maarif to demonstrate that consistent pro-Palestinian stances are accompanied by diverse articulations from anti-imperialist fervor to dialogic approaches. Rizqullah and Aisyah (2025) add a parliamentary dimension by highlighting the role of BKSAP DPR as a guardian of the moral corridor of executive policy.

The second cluster captures the transition from moral support to operational action. Gati and Hafid (2024) and Chandra et al. (2024) document Indonesia's role as mediator, facilitator, and provider of medical aid following the Hamas–Israel war of 2023. Manurung and Prihantoro (2025) introduce the concept of 'Concrete Action Diplomacy' to describe Indonesia's role transformation from humanitarian donor to regional security guarantor, while Yunazwardi et al. (2025) debate the ethical implications of the temporary relocation option for Gaza residents within the framework of humanitarian diplomacy.

The third cluster dissects economic pragmatism and international pressure through the two-level games framework. Barton and Rubenstein (2005) and Eliraz and Rakhmat (2023) reveal a pattern of 'stable non-recognition with functional contacts' operating in trade and security sectors. Mukti (2023) maps unofficial trade routes through third parties, while Izzurrahman and Prayetno (2024) focus their analysis on the dilemma between OECD accession ambitions and pro-Palestinian commitments that demand a balance of domestic and international win-sets.

The fourth cluster highlights presidential leadership and discourse analysis as drivers of policy change. Yadav (2025) describes the shift in Indonesia's foreign policy under Prabowo as an 'assertive identity' positioning Indonesia as an

influential middle power. Suswanto Ismadi Megah et al. (2021) and Isnaeni (2025) provide methodological grounding through speech act analysis and attitudinal analysis of presidential speeches, while Thies and Sari (2018) demonstrate that Indonesia's middle power status requires external recognition of its roles as 'good international citizen' and supporter of multilateralism.

Despite its richness, the existing literature has three main limitations. First, systematic corpus-based examinations of Prabowo's speeches as the primary locus of identity production remain rare. Second, existing studies tend to map dilemmas (normative vs pragmatic) without dissecting the public communication mechanisms that navigate domestic and international audiences simultaneously. Third, the idiosyncratic dimension of leadership, particularly how Prabowo's military background shapes his diplomatic style, has not been theoretically integrated with constructivist and two-level games frameworks. This study seeks to address these gaps.

3. Theoretical Framework

This study integrates four complementary theoretical frameworks: constructivism, national role theory, idiosyncratic leadership, and two-level games. This combination is chosen because the rearticulation of foreign policy identity cannot be explained through a single approach. It involves normative structures, leader agency, and multi-actor negotiation dynamics.

Wendt's constructivism (1992; 1999) provides the ontological foundation that national interests are formed through social processes of identity and norms. Material capabilities only acquire political meaning when interpreted through intersubjective understandings. In the context of Gaza, the 1945 Constitution, Hatta's independent and active doctrine, and the Bandung Spirit function as normative structures that constrain and enable presidential action. However, structures are not deterministic. Leaders, as active agents, can reinterpret the boundaries of appropriateness through speeches and diplomatic practices.

Role theory (Holsti, 1970; Harnisch, 2012; Thies, 2017) clarifies how identity is translated into specific roles: Palestinian defender, mediator, security contributor, or humanitarian actor. Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) introduce the concepts of vertical and horizontal role contestation to

capture the tug-of-war dynamics between government and civil society actors in defining 'what role is appropriate'. This framework is relevant for reading Indonesia's role conception shift from solidarity maker to operational peace-keeper.

The idiosyncratic approach (Byman & Pollack, 2001; Hermann, 1980) is used to dissect the personal dimension of Prabowo's leadership as a 'critical intervening variable' that filters structures into concrete policy choices. Prabowo's belief system, motivations, and decision-making style shaped by military command experience, personal diplomatic networks, and the philosophy of 'a thousand friends are too few, one enemy is too many' form a distinctive operational code that differentiates him from his predecessors.

Finally, Putnam's two-level games (1988) bridges identity analysis with the practice of policy formulation. Each presidential speech is a simultaneous negotiation at Level I (international forums) and Level II (domestic audiences). The win-set concept (the range of international agreements that can still be ratified domestically) is used to measure the flexibility of Indonesia's position amid resistance from Islamic mass organizations, parliament, and digital public opinion. The integration of these four frameworks enables a multidimensional analysis of identity rearticulation in Prabowo's discourse.

4. Research Method

This study employs a qualitative approach with a single case study design that is descriptive-analytical in nature (Creswell & Creswell, 2022). The primary corpus (P) consists of seven key speeches and official statements by President Prabowo Subianto during 2024–2025: the speech at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2024 (P01), the presidential inauguration speech 2024 (P02), the Antalya Diplomacy Forum 2025 (P03), the 19th PUIC Conference (P04), the UN High Level Conference on Palestine 2025 (P05), the 80th UN General Assembly (P06), and the inaugural Board of Peace meeting 2026 (P07) as a contextual implication.

The response corpus (R) includes official statements from Islamic mass organizations (Muhammadiyah, NU, MUI), positions of political parties, press releases from civil society coalitions, and publicly available international responses. The analysis is conducted in two stages:

first, Qualitative Content Analysis (Kuckartz & Rädiker, 2023) to map identity patterns and national role claims; second, Laclauian discourse analysis (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Bakumov, 2022) to dissect mechanisms of meaning rearticulation through nodal points, floating signifiers, and antagonism. Source triangulation is performed across official documents and credible media to maintain data validity.

5. Identity Rearticulation in Prabowo's Diplomacy

5.1 Discursive Structure: Nodal Points and Floating Signifiers

Laclauian analysis reveals that Prabowo's speeches restructure diplomatic concepts through two discursive operations. First, 'anti-colonialism' is preserved as the central nodal point, but its scope is expanded from religious solidarity toward universal humanitarianism. In his inauguration speech of 20 October 2024, Prabowo drew a direct line between Indonesia's colonial experience and Palestinian suffering, while emphasizing operational readiness: dispatching medical teams, evacuating wounded victims, and utilizing military hospitals to assist Gaza residents who had become victims of war.

Second, 'peace' is refilled as a floating signifier. No longer interpreted as merely a ceasefire, peace is framed as 'peace without hate, peace without suspicion', a condition that requires the recognition of Palestinian sovereignty alongside guarantees of Israeli security. This rearticulation shifts the logic of antagonism: Indonesia's adversary is no longer a particular state entity but rather the structure of oppression and double standards. This shift allows Indonesia to speak in a frequency acceptable to Western audiences without losing its moral pro-Palestinian anchor.

An important and easily overlooked dimension is strategic silence (Dingli, 2015). Although Prabowo repeatedly mentioned 'massacre' and 'innocent victims', he never used the term 'genocide' even after Amnesty International and the ICC adopted such terminology. This restraint in diction is not a softening of substance, Prabowo still conditioned recognition of Israel upon recognition of Palestine, a position more stringent than that of many Western states. The silence is a calibration that allows Indonesia to maintain the diplomatic access necessary to play

the role of operational peacekeeper on the ground.

Table 1. Rearticulation of Discourse Elements in Prabowo's Speeches on Gaza

Discourse Element	Traditional Articulation	Prabowo's Rearticulation	Impact on Identity
Nodal Point	Islamic solidarity / Anti-Zionism	Universal anti-colonialism / Humanitarianism	Expanding the legitimacy base into the secular-global domain
Floating Signifier: Peace	Absence of war / Ceasefire	Collective stability / Two-sided security	Positioning Indonesia as a rational actor (middle power)
Logic of Antagonism	Indonesia/Palestine vs Israel	Global justice vs Double standards / Oppression	Reducing diplomatic friction with Western actors

(Source: compiled by the author from the 2024–2025 speech corpus)

5.2 Role Conception Transformation: From Solidarity Maker to Operational Peacekeeper

A more substantial transformation occurs at the level of role conception. Since the era of Soekarno, Indonesia has played the role of a 'solidarity builder' that is vocal in moral condemnation but limited at the symbolic level. The Prabowo era marks a shift toward the role of 'operational peacekeeper' and 'security-humanitarian provider' (Holsti, 1970; Manurung & Prihantoro, 2025).

This shift is driven by the structural failure of international mechanisms. By the end of December 2025, Israel had recorded 969 ceasefire violations resulting in 418 fatalities, while only 19,764 of the promised 48,000 aid trucks were permitted entry. The UN Security Council repeatedly failed to produce binding resolutions due to U.S. vetoes. In this context, Prabowo offered an approach that 'becomes action' rather than merely 'being voice'—including the commitment of 20,000 UN peacekeeping personnel, contributions of 2,715 personnel to UNPKO, and the delivery of logistical aid through Hercules airdrops.

Table 2. Evolution of Indonesia's Diplomatic Role under Prabowo

Traditional Role	New Role	Empirical Indicators
Solidarity Builder	Operational Peacekeeper	Offer of 20,000 UN personnel (UNGA 2025); 2,715 personnel deployed in UNPKO (2024)

Traditional Role	New Role	Empirical Indicators
Norm Defender	Security & Humanitarian Provider	Gaza field hospital, ~1,000 medical evacuations; KRI dr. Radjiman delivering 242 tons of aid
Non-Aligned Position	Assertive Bridge Builder	Conditional normalization statement (May 2025); critique of Western double standards at UNGA 2025
Moral Voice of the Developing World	Affirmative Multilateral Actor	Food and climate commitments; language of 'shared responsibility' and 'civilian protection'

Source: compiled by the author from Prabowo's speeches 2024–2025 and UNPKO data

This role shift simultaneously reflects the logic of norm entrepreneurship (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), in which Indonesia attempts to establish a new standard for developing countries: that middle powers do not merely make speeches but also bear concrete responsibility for collective security. As a consequence, the continuity of anti-colonial values is combined with pragmatic multilateralism, a combination not previously explored comprehensively by his predecessors.

5.3 The Idiosyncratic Dimension of Prabowo's Leadership

Following the framework of Hermann (1980) and Byman and Pollack (2001), three idiosyncratic dimensions of Prabowo shape his operational code. First, Prabowo's belief system shifts from ideological purity toward 'pragmatic securitizer'. Indonesia's identity as defender of Palestine remains firm, but the manner of defending is filtered through the logic of stability and concrete capability. Second, Prabowo's achievement motivation drives efforts to demonstrate diplomatic 'weight' through action: hospital ships, medical evacuations, and proposed Gaza-Indonesia Special Economic Zone reconstruction schemes.

Third, Prabowo's action-oriented decision-making style shaped by command experience in Kopassus and Kostrad, as well as personal diplomatic networks built during exile in Jordan, produces a more centralized, swift diplomacy that is willing to bear reputational risk (Haripin et al., 2025; Setiawan & Fathun, 2025). The philosophy 'a thousand friends are too few, one enemy is too many' is manifested in the multi-alignment strategy: joining BRICS in January 2025 while maintaining the OECD accession track, strengthening the Two-Plus-Two dialogue

with China, while expanding the Super Garuda Shield partnership with the United States.

Domestic achievements, particularly the record rice production of 34.71 million tons and reserves of 3 million tons in 2025, serve as material legitimacy for speaking with greater confidence in international forums. For Prabowo, food self-sufficiency is a prerequisite for diplomatic dignity. This combination of military discipline, economic pragmatism, and humanitarian sensitivity differentiates his approach from Soekarno (idealist-revolutionary), Soeharto (pragmatic-closed), Wahid (dialogic-experimental), SBY (multilateralist-moderate), and Jokowi (economy-centric).

6. Constraints and Opportunities in Policy Transformation

6.1 Domestic Win-Set Dynamics (Level II)

At the domestic level, the identity transformation introduced by Prabowo confronts a layered structure of veto players. The main actors include parliament through the BKSAP DPR, religious mass organizations (particularly Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) and public opinion in the digital sphere. NU, through Ahmad Fahrur Rozi, tends to support Prabowo's strategic diplomacy as long as the goal of Palestinian independence is preserved, while Muhammadiyah, through Anwar Abbas, sets a more rigid limit: no normalization without Israel's 'repentance' for war crimes.

Table 3. Mapping of Domestic Actors and Win-Sets toward Prabowo's Rearticulation

Domestic Actor	Basis of Legitimacy	Response to Rearticulation	Tolerance Limit (Win-Set)
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	Pluralism, <i>wasathiyah</i> , dialogic diplomacy	Supports strategic diplomatic language as long as Palestinian independence remains the goal	Accepts active mediation and the two-state solution within recognized multilateral frameworks
Muhammadiyah	Global justice & theological solidarity	Demands Israeli 'repentance' and end of occupation before any normalization talks	Rejects security language perceived as legitimizing Israeli aggression
Parliament / BKSAP	Constitutional mandate of the 1945 Constitution	Guards the executive against softening; pushes for UN reform	Rejects any concession seen as deviating from the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution
Scholars & Activists	Anti-imperialism & human rights	Criticizes the diction of 'Israeli security' and the technocratization of colonial issues	Rejects symbolic normalization, demands accountability for human rights violations

(Source: compiled by the author from official statements and public responses 2024–2026)

This variation in positions creates win-set complexity: the president's room for maneuver tends to be flexible at the multilateral mediation level but tightens around language that may be interpreted as normalization. Prabowo responds with a layered framing strategy—constitutional-moral (references to the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution), strategic-operational ('boots on the ground', field hospital), and pragmatic-sovereign ('peace without hate'). A four-hour closed-door meeting with 50 Islamic mass organization leaders in February 2026 became a key instrument for dampening opposition regarding Indonesia's involvement in the Board of Peace, with assurances that the mission of Indonesian forces was purely humanitarian.

The digital public sphere adds another layer of complexity. Clips of the UNGA-80 speech emphasizing 'guaranteed Israeli security' circulated without the conditional context, triggering narratives of covert normalization. Within the framework of Cantir and Kaarbo (2016), this phenomenon reflects horizontal role contestation typical of the social media era—where every diction is dissected, cut, and reinterpreted by non-governmental actors at high speed.

6.2 Negotiating the Global Stage (Level I)

At the international level, Indonesia positions itself as an 'affirmative middle power' bridging Western pragmatism expectations and Global South solidarity demands. OECD accession requires consensus from all members including Israel, while BRICS membership since January 2025 provides counterbalancing leverage. The multi-alignment strategy enables Indonesia to be an 'honest broker' acceptable to diverse parties: Muslim identity provides access to OIC, economic profile opens the path to OECD, and anti-colonial rhetoric maintains legitimacy in NAM and BRICS.

The commitment of 20,000 UN troops is an instrument of 'status diplomacy' to elevate Indonesia's bargaining power in shaping the Gaza reconstruction agenda. However, the role claim as a security provider carries risks: involvement in Western-dominated mechanisms may be read as a betrayal of the Palestinian struggle, while passivity would compromise middle power credibility. Prabowo navigates this dilemma through

explicit conditionality (recognition of Israel only after recognition of Palestinian sovereignty) which preserves moral consistency in the eyes of the Global South while opening communication channels with Washington and other Western capitals.

6.3 Structural Role Conflict

The role transformation entails the consequence of structural conflict between defender identity and mediator aspirations. As a defender, Indonesia is bound by language of stern condemnation; as a mediator, it is required to use diction acceptable to all parties. This tension is visible in the differing tones of Prabowo's speeches at OIC forums, which are more confrontational, compared with his more calibrated speeches at the UN act as a strategy that Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) refer to as a form of role compartmentalization to maintain coherence before heterogeneous audiences.

Table 4. Role Conflict and Prabowo's Identity Resolution

Role Conflict	Solidarity Demands	Pragmatism Demands	Prabowo's Identity Resolution
Mediator vs Defender	Total alignment & condemnation of Israel	Inclusive dialogue & security guarantees for all parties	'Peace without hate': Israeli security as a consequence of Palestinian independence
Autonomy vs Alliance	Reject Western dominance & uphold Non-Aligned principles	Pursue market access & global security-economic networks	'Multi-alignment': simultaneously joining BRICS while pursuing OECD for maximum bargaining power
Budget vs Morality	State budget prioritized for domestic welfare	Resource allocation for aid/reconstruction as reputational investment	Reaffirming that reconstruction funding is voluntary and non-permanent

(Source: compiled by the author from Prabowo's speeches 2024–2025)

Indonesia's experience at the OECD illustrates the greatest complexity. Accession is considered a prerequisite for escaping the middle-income trap and realizing the Indonesia Emas 2045 vision, yet Israel's status as a full member creates a 'firewall' for diplomacy. Although the government insists that accession will not change Indonesia's position toward Israel, the consensus requirement opens space for politically sensitive functional interaction. Prabowo's resolution to the dilemma of joining BRICS while pursuing OECD reflects an effort to

construct an equilibrium that may be fragile yet strategic in the short term.

7. Conclusion

This study demonstrates that during 2024–2025, Indonesia's foreign policy identity underwent significant rearticulation without losing its normative anchor. The shift occurs across three mutually reinforcing dimensions: first, the discursive structure changed with 'anti-colonialism' preserved as the nodal point but 'peace' refilled as a floating signifier requiring collective stability; second, role conception shifted from a normative solidarity maker toward an affirmative operational peacekeeper marked by the commitment of 20,000 UN troops, hospital ships, and Gaza reconstruction plans; third, Prabowo's idiosyncratic dimension blends military discipline, economic pragmatism, and humanitarian sensitivity in a distinctive multi-alignment strategy.

This transformation has not unfolded without friction. The narrowing of the domestic win-set due to resistance from Islamic mass organizations, parliament, and digital public opinion has compelled Prabowo to undertake constant discursive calibration. Strategic silence on the diction of 'genocide', the conditionality of recognizing Israel only upon Palestinian independence, and the layered framing strategy serve as instruments to maintain moral consistency before domestic audiences while expanding diplomatic access on the global stage. The structural tensions between defender and mediator roles are managed through role compartmentalization—adjusting tone across different forums.

Prabowo's approach can be read as an effort to re-stitch the independent and active doctrine to remain relevant in the twenty-first century. Indonesia's foreign policy now appears more institutional, operational, and security-sensitive, while consistently upholding the red line of anti-colonialism and humanitarian values. Indonesia's involvement in the Board of Peace in early 2026 becomes a consequential testing ground that will determine whether the identity shift crystallizes into a sustainable pattern or triggers significant domestic political contraction.

Several policy recommendations can be drawn from these findings. First, the government needs to strengthen public communication that explains the mandate and limits of Indonesia's international missions, particularly the limit of non-disarmament of Palestinian resistance

factions to allay domestic suspicions. Second, diplomatic institutionalization should be developed to ensure that the transformation does not depend on the personal figure of the president. Third, coordination among the executive, parliament (BKSAP), and Islamic mass organizations should be formalized through routine consultation mechanisms to strengthen domestic legitimacy. Fourth, Indonesia needs to develop analytical capacity to monitor the impact of strategic silence and discursive calibration on international credibility. Fifth, periodic evaluations of consistency between rhetoric and operational action should be conducted to ensure that defense diplomacy does not erode the normative anchor that has historically been the source of Indonesia's legitimacy in the Global South.

With proper calibration between moral anchor and operational capability, Indonesia has the opportunity to strengthen its position as a middle power capable of translating anti-colonial commitments into effective, legitimate, and trustworthy diplomatic actions—both in the eyes of its own people and the international community as it navigates Asia's twenty-first century multipolarity.

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Islam dan Ideologi Transnasional: Perspektif Al-Qur'an tentang Universalitas

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ABSTRACT

Nilai-nilai universalitas ideologi agama dan konsep negara-bangsa sering sekali mendapatkan sebuah perdebatan tentang existensi keduanya. Gerakan transnasional yang terus mengikuti gejala globalisasi seolah mendapatkan wadah yang sesuai bagi penyebaran ideologinya. Sementara itu, konsep negara-bangsa yang sangat erat berkaitan dengan batas-batas teritorial negara dan kedaulatannya secara pasti mempunyai batas kewilayahan yang jelas. Wacana teori hubungan internasional yang membahas tentang kedaulatan dan universalitas seringkali mendapatkan irisan yang mudah dipertemukan akan tetapi sangat tidak memungkinkan untuk diterapkan pada kenyataan kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara. Substansi dari universalitas ideologi agama dan konsep negara-bangsa tidak pernah akan menyatu dalam sebuah tata kelola pemerintahan suatu negara modern.

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Pendahuluan

Apakah Islam, berdasarkan ajarannya yang melekat, selaras atau menyimpang dari ideologi transnasional seringkali menjadi perdebatan akademis. Menurut Myers (2006), perdebatan ini sangat penting karena ayat-ayat tertentu dalam Al-Qur'an mengungkapkan prinsip-prinsip universalitas dan lingkup ideologinya yang luas, yang menunjukkan kerangka kerja yang melampaui batas geografis konvensional. Konsep ruang politik Islam, yang memiliki fondasi sejarah dan teologis, sering kali berbeda dengan model kedaulatan nasional yang terpisah di Westphalia. Model Westphalia mencerminkan pengalaman sosial-politik yang lebih luas sebelum globalisasi (Salvatore, 2007).

Penekanan Al-Qur'an pada Ummah, atau komunitas global yang bersatu, yang secara

teoritis melampaui perbedaan ras dan nasional, semakin memperparah ketegangan antara ideologi Islam yang berorientasi internasional dan paradigma negara-bangsa modern ini. Menurut Naazer (2018), para akademisi Muslim sering memiliki pandangan kritis terhadap negara-bangsa karena perspektif ini. Mereka berpendapat bahwa pembagian teritorial seperti ini merusak persatuan Islam dan menempatkan umat Islam dihadapan eksploitasi luar. Oleh karena itu, fondasi ideologis ini menantang organisasi normatif negara-bangsa secara keseluruhan, terutama ketika diterjemahkan oleh organisasi kontemporer tertentu (Kaneva & Stanton, 2020).

Selanjutnya, perspektif supranasionalis Islam, yang berakar pada ayat-ayat Al-Qur'an yang menekankan satu komunitas global, berbeda prinsip kedaulatan teritorial yang

dilindungi oleh perjanjian internasional seperti Perdamaian Westphalia dan Pasal 2 Piagam PBB (Khelghat-Doost, 2023). Ketegangan ini menunjukkan bahwa mendamaikan universalisme Islam dengan sistem negara modern adalah masalah yang sulit. Selain itu, orientasi politik Sayyid Qutb, yang membedakan antara kedaulatan Tuhan dan sistem manusia, menantang pemahaman sekuler tentang kedaulatan dan ketertiban. Ini membuat Islam sebagai ideologi transnasional yang mengubah hubungan antara agama dan kekuasaan (Paipais, 2018). Dengan munculnya perspektif keagamaan dalam ilmu politik, perspektif ideologis ini semakin rumit.

Definisi Transnasionalisme

Perbandingan historis antara Islam dan Katolik Roma sebagai fenomena "trans-peradaban" mendukung perspektif definisi transnasionalisme ini (Sarhini & Effendi, 2020). Kedua agama menawarkan teologi universal dan memiliki peran politik yang signifikan dalam berbagai konteks nasional dan internasional. Paralel ini menunjukkan bagaimana sistem kepercayaan universalis seperti itu dapat berdampak besar pada institusi politik dan standar masyarakat. Hal ini sering menantang atau mengubah paradigma negara-sentris (Haynes, 2022).

Ideologi seperti ini seringkali bertentangan sistem Westphalia yang berpusat pada kedaulatan negara-bangsa, dengan mendorong model pemerintahan alternatif yang melampaui batas nasional (Garofalo, 2006). Munculnya kembali agama sebagai kekuatan global yang kuat, khususnya Islam, sering berlawanan dengan paradigma negara-bangsa yang mapan, menyebabkan perdebatan besar tentang bagaimana identitas agama transnasional sesuai dengan struktur politik kontemporer (Jong, 2023). Sebenarnya, gerakan-gerakan tersebut memiliki tujuan yang jelas ketika mereka menentang intervensi negara dalam bidang seperti pendidikan atau kebijakan keluarga, atau menantang korupsi pemerintah; ini menunjukkan hubungan yang berkembang antara ideologi agama transnasional dan tata kelola nasional (Garofalo, 2006).

Keterlibatan yang selalu berubah ini sering menggambarkan bagaimana universalisme agama dapat menjadi reaksi politik terhadap hegemoni global yang dirasakan dan penutupan penentuan nasib sendiri politik (Tutt, 2023). Resistensi ini adalah hasil dari "glokalisasi", yaitu

penerapan ajaran agama global kedalam konteks lokal, menghasilkan agen politik-keagamaan transnasional yang berbeda (della Porta & Keating, 2008). Selain itu, untuk memahami jangkauan global dan dinamika yang berkembang, de-territorialisasi sistem agama Islam diperlukan, yang didorong oleh elemen seperti migrasi dan media (Medina, 2020).

Konsep Ideologi Transnasional

Menurut definisinya, ideologi transnasional berarti melampaui batas negara dan berusaha memobilisasi individu dan kelompok di berbagai lanskap geopolitik dengan tujuan dan keyakinan yang sama. Hal ini sering kali melibatkan gagasan penerapan universal, yang bertujuan untuk menyatukan orang-orang dari berbagai negara berdasarkan ideologi yang sama, bukan batas geografis atau kesetiaan nasional. Menurut Ayatollah Khomeini, "Islam datang untuk kemanusiaan" (Khelghat-Doost, 2023), penekanan pada "Ummah", sebuah komunitas Muslim global yang melampaui perbedaan etnis dan nasional, adalah inti dari gagasan ini dalam konteks Islam. Menurut Mohammed (2024), perspektif teologis ini sejalan dengan gagasan bahwa Islam menyediakan perspektif dunia yang komprehensif, menyatukan umat manusia di bawah satu sistem hukum yang berasal dari Al-Qur'an dan Sunnah, melampaui perbedaan geografis dan nasional.

Namun, keinginan universalistik ini sering bertentangan dengan struktur negara modern. Sayyid Qutb, misalnya, menentang kerangka negara-bangsa untuk membentuk masyarakat Islam global yang tidak terbatas geografis (Rock-Singer, 2022). Oleh karena itu, struktur ini menimbulkan konflik alami antara tuntutan identitas agama universal dan kebutuhan teritorial kedaulatan negara. Ini mencerminkan perselisihan sejarah antara negara-negara baru dan Gereja Katolik di Eropa pada abad pertengahan (Buzan, 2004).

Paralel sejarah ini menunjukkan masalah abadi yang ditimbulkan oleh ideologi yang mencoba menyatukan orang-orang yang beragam dalam satu sistem kepercayaan yang menyeluruh, yang seringkali bertentangan dengan sistem politik yang sudah ada. Interaksi antara postulasi agama universalistik dan formasi politik modern semakin diperumit oleh perkembangan historis istilah "negara" dalam wacana Islam, yang tidak ditemukan dalam Al-Qur'an dan sumber-sumber

Islam awal dalam arti modernnya (Feyyaz, 2013). Ketentuan ini menunjukkan perbedaan fundamental dalam pemikiran politik Islam dan teori politik Barat, terutama tentang bagaimana dan dimana kekuasaan politik. Misalnya, gerakan Salafi berusaha mengarahkan kembali rasa memiliki umat beriman dari afiliasi lokal dan teritorial ke ruang Islam yang abstrak dan tidak teritorial, menantang negara-negara dari dalam (Pall, 2024). Reorientasi ini memerlukan pemusnahan identitas dan kesetiaan nasional yang sudah ada. Ini akan mengutamakan pembentukan komunitas imajiner yang memprioritaskan kepatuhan terhadap hukum Islam dan proyek politik kolektif daripada ikatan etnis atau teritorial.

Konsep Islam sebagai Ideologi Transnasional

Menurut Arigita (2020), konsep "Ummah", yang menunjukkan komunitas Muslim di seluruh dunia yang bersatu oleh iman daripada batas nasional atau teritorial, adalah dasar dari perdebatan tentang Islam sebagai ideologi yang melampaui batas nasional. Identitas menjadi tidak teritorial, yang menyebabkan dinamika yang kompleks antara identitas agama dan kedaulatan negara. Hal ini disebabkan oleh fakta bahwa kesetiaan kepada komunitas Muslim global sering kali lebih penting daripada kesetiaan kepada negara-bangsa tertentu (Galal & Fibiger, 2020).

Ini semakin rumit karena fundamentalisme Islam, yang seringkali mendukung "ummah" global yang menantang sistem negara-bangsa Westphalia dan menganggap kewarganegaraan global berdasarkan iman daripada kebangsaan (Iqbal & Zulkifli, 2016). Konsep ini bertolak belakang dengan pemahaman konvensional tentang kewarganegaraan karena menawarkan kesetiaan yang didasarkan pada keyakinan agama yang melintasi batas geografis. Kerangka kerja seperti ini sering menghasilkan kenyataan atas kewarganegaraan *post*-nasional, dimana orang diatur oleh hukum Islam secara keseluruhan daripada aturan negara tertentu (Iqbal & Zulkifli, 2016).

Selain itu, penolakan terhadap batasan teritorial dalam konteks Islam menunjukkan keinginan terus-menerus untuk membangun tatanan moral dan hukum universal yang berfungsi diluar batas negara (Iqbal, 2017). Oleh karena

itu, dari sudut pandang ini, Islam dianggap sebagai ideologi yang pada dasarnya bersifat transnasional karena ajarannya dan manifestasi historisnya menunjukkan keinginan yang konsisten untuk komunitas umat Islam yang bersatu di seluruh dunia (Garofalo, 2006).

Sebaliknya, beberapa gerakan Islam mengejar kewarganegaraan global untuk "Ummah" dengan menantang model negara-bangsa. Namun, beberapa interpretasi mengakui bahwa negara dapat dibentuk berdasarkan etnis dan teritorial asalkan hukum Islam diterapkan di wilayah mereka (Iqbal & Zulkifli, 2016; Naazer, 2018). Meskipun demikian, interpretasi yang berbeda ini mendorong perdebatan tentang seberapa cocok universalisme Islam dengan struktur internasional kontemporer, di mana prinsip kedaulatan negara masih menjadi dasar (Atzori, 2013).

Metodologi Studi Transnasionalisme Islam

Karena keanekaragaman sifat Islam transnasional, para peneliti sering menggunakan berbagai metode metodologis untuk meneliti manifestasi dan konsekuensi Islam secara menyeluruh. Untuk mengurai hubungan kompleks antara praktik lokal dan cita-cita Islam global, pendekatan ini sering kali menggabungkan studi kasus komparatif, penelitian etnografis, dan analisis teks kitab suci agama (Lacroix, 2005). Untuk memahami perkembangan transnasionalisme Islam, yang melacak perubahannya melintasi berbagai era dan konteks geopolitik, sangat penting untuk melakukan analisis historis. Metodologi yang beragam ini sangat penting untuk memahami bagaimana hukum Islam terintegrasi dalam sistem hukum nasional yang berbeda, mengingat pluralisme hukum yang sering terjadi (Karimullah, 2023).

Misalnya, analisis dapat menyelidiki bagaimana Syariah, sebagai sistem moral dan hukum yang lengkap, berinteraksi dengan kerangka hukum sekuler di negara-negara (Mohammed & Jureidini, 2022). Upaya untuk mendamaikan klaim universalistik yurisprudensi Islam dengan tuntutan spesifik terhadap sistem hukum dan kedaulatan nasional merupakan tantangan metodologis (della Porta & Keating, 2008). Ini termasuk melihat bagaimana berbagai mazhab hukum Islam memahami dan menerapkan hukum internasional, menunjukkan berbagai

perspektif terhadap tata kelola global dalam pandangan hukum Islam (Karimullah, 2023). Selain itu, para peneliti juga menggunakan humaniora digital untuk menganalisis wacana Islam diinternet. Ini menawarkan pemahaman tentang bagaimana identitas Islam transnasional dibentuk dan diperdebatkan di dunia maya (Isbah & Wibawanto, 2021).

Selain itu, munculnya aktor non-negara yang termotivasi agama dan beroperasi lintas batas membutuhkan pemahaman yang lebih mendalam tentang dasar ideologis yang mendorong tindakan transnasional mereka (Lakitsch, 2021). Banyak bentuk ekspresi transnasionalisme Islam, mulai dari organisasi bantuan kemanusiaan hingga kelompok militan, memiliki visi yang berbeda untuk solidaritas Islam global, yang membuat pemeriksaan ini semakin rumit (Lune & Berg, 2017). Pemanfaatan narasi keagamaan, yang mencakup kitab suci dan ajaran, memberi kita dasar ideal untuk memahami berbagai ekspresi ini (Lakitsch, 2021). Aktor Muslim sering menyesuaikan pesan mereka untuk audiens internal dan eksternal, menekankan motivasi keagamaan secara internal, dan menekankan hak asasi manusia universal dan anti-diskriminasi dalam wacana publik, yang membuat fenomena ini semakin rumit (Porta, 2014).

Islam Sebuah Potensi Ideologi Transnasional

Gerakan jihadis transnasional yang memperjuangkan "ummah" global sering menggunakan interpretasi kalimah ini. Gerakan ini menghubungkan pengikutnya di seluruh dunia melalui ideologi bersama yang berasal dari ulama Islam terkemuka seperti Ibnu Taimiyah, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, dan Sayyid Qutb (Krause, 2022). Kelompok yang mendukung negara Islam diseluruh dunia sering menggunakan istilah "Ummah", terkadang menggunakan frase seperti "Pan-Islamisme" untuk mendapatkan dukungan sosial-politik untuk kampanye mereka (Bachtiar, 2018).

Perspektif ini melihat Islam sebagai sesuatu yang bersifat transnasional; doktrinnya membantu membangun masyarakat yang melampaui batas negara, berusaha untuk menciptakan tatanan Islam global (Murod et al., 2022). Fenomena historis dan terus-menerus dari komunitas Muslim minoritas di berbagai negara-bangsa mendukung konsepsi Islam sebagai ideologi

transnasional (Köroğlu & Brodard, 2024). Komunitas-komunitas ini sering memiliki hubungan budaya dan agama yang kuat dengan identitas Islam global yang lebih luas daripada hanya konteks nasional mereka sendiri. Hal ini telah menyebabkan perdebatan ilmiah yang berkelanjutan tentang apakah Islam, khususnya interpretasi tertentu, merupakan ideologi transnasional karena penekanannya pada masyarakat global dan klaim universalisiknya (Krause, 2022).

Studi akademis saat ini berfokus pada apakah ideologi Islam secara intrinsik mendorong tatanan politik universal atau apakah interpretasi seperti itu merupakan interpretasi selektif yang menyimpang dari ajaran inti (Bachtiar, 2018; Krause, 2022). Selain itu, gagasan bahwa "Ummah" adalah komunitas tunggal yang terdiri dari semua Muslim, melampaui perbedaan ras, etnis, atau nasional, mendukung argumen untuk pendekatan Islam yang universal. Namun, interpretasi ini tidak diterima secara luas. Banyak sarjana berpendapat bahwa istilah "Ummah" lebih sering merujuk pada persaudaraan spiritual daripada negara global (Bachtiar, 2018; Sumaktoyo, 2020). Namun, para pemimpin Islam radikal, termasuk Sayyid Qutb, telah secara luas memanfaatkan gagasan "Ummah" untuk mendukung entitas politik yang bersatu yang melampaui batas pemerintahan dan struktur negara konvensional, menekankan keyakinan sebagai faktor utama yang menentukan identitas dan kohesi kolektif (Nabavi, 2024). Menurut perspektif ini, iman Islam secara intrinsik mendorong identitas internasional, mengikat umat beriman dalam komunitas global melampaui kesetiaan mereka kepada negara bangsa masing-masing (Hamed, 2021).

Karakteristik Ideologi Transnasional

Dalam kebanyakan kasus, ideologi transnasional menunjukkan sejumlah karakteristik penting. Salah satunya adalah bahwa itu mencakup secara universal lebih dari batas nasional tertentu, menekankan nilai dan tujuan bersama yang menyatukan berbagai kelompok orang, dan seringkali menantang kedaulatan teritorial negara-bangsa secara langsung atau tidak langsung (Ikenberry & Buzan, 2004; Schulz-Forberg et al., 2021). Dengan sikap universalis mereka, mereka dapat berinteraksi dengan orang-orang di berbagai konteks nasional, menumbuhkan

rasa identitas dan tujuan bersama yang melampaui perbedaan geografis.

Selain itu, ideologi-ideologi ini sering memanfaatkan teknologi komunikasi dan transportasi kontemporer untuk memudahkan pergerakan ide, dana, dan pengikut di seluruh dunia, memperkuat karakter transnasional mereka (Murod et al., 2022). Mereka berusaha membangun kerangka normatif yang melampaui sistem etika dan hukum nasional dan sering mendukung penataan ulang masyarakat global berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip dasar mereka (Schulz-Forberg et al., 2021). Misalnya, gerakan Islam tidak terbatas pada batas negara atau pemerintahan; mereka berusaha untuk memaksakan perspektif global mereka pada wilayah yang tidak terbatas oleh perbatasan teritorial yang ditetapkan secara hukum. Mereka seringkali mendukung penerapan syariah Islam secara menyeluruh sebagai cara untuk mencapai tatanan ilahi (Murod et al., 2022). Mengglobalisasi kerangka kognitif, menyebarkan gagasan dan visi mereka ke luar batas negara, dan seringkali dikaitkan dengan respons terhadap masalah sosial global yang dirasakan seringkali merupakan bagian dari tujuan ini (Iqbal & Zulkifli, 2016).

Universalitas dan Domain dalam Teks Islam

Misalnya, Al-Qur'an Surat Al Mukminun 52 menyatakan, وَإِنَّ هَذِهِ أُمَّتُكُمْ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَأَنَا رَبُّكُمْ فَاتَّقُونِ , juga Al Anbiya 92 إِنَّ هَذِهِ أُمَّتُكُمْ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَأَنَا رَبُّكُمْ فَاعْبُدُونِ ﴿٩٢﴾ secara eksplisit mendorong identitas global umat Islam yang bersatu, melampaui pembagian geografis dan kesukuan. Menurut Medina (2020), penekanan kitab suci pada komunitas yang bersatu (Ummah) menggaris-bawahi landasan teologis universalisme (agama), yang berlawanan struktur nasionalistik. Selanjutnya, setelah nasionalisme pan-Arab sekuler memudar, terutama setelah Perang Enam Hari tahun 1967, gagasan "Ummah" sebagai komunitas global yang terdiri dari orang-orang beriman kembali muncul, menunjukkan pergeseran menuju identitas yang lebih luas dan universal. Penekanan kembali pada "Ummah" sebagai komunitas universal ini semakin diperkuat oleh kondisi dunia modern yang memungkinkan orang bergerak dan berpikir, menjadikan penanda identitas transnasional ini semakin menarik bagi banyak orang Muslim (Mauro, 2024). Memang, para ulama Islam abad

pertengahan, seperti Ibnu Taimiyah, mengakui bahwa "Ummah" memiliki sifat yang melampaui batas geografis dan dapat mencakup seluruh dunia, bahkan jika terdiri dari banyak negara (Naazer, 2018).

Menurut Al-Dakkak (2019), ayat-ayat Al-Qur'an sering kali menggambarkan tujuan Islam yang universal, menekankan bahwa itu berlaku untuk semua manusia, bukan hanya untuk kelompok etnis atau geografis tertentu. Perintah yang menuntut umat Islam untuk menyebarkan pesan Islam ke seluruh dunia, melampaui batas politik dan nasional konvensional, menunjukkan perspektif universalistik ini. Perintah-perintah Al-Qur'an seperti, misalnya, "Wahai manusia!" Kami membuatmu dari seorang laki-laki dan seorang perempuan dan membuatmu menjadi bangsa-bangsa dan suku-suku untuk membuatmu mengenal satu sama lain. "Sesungguhnya yang paling mulia di antara kamu di sisi Allah ialah yang paling takwa di antara kamu" (Munajat, 2023) menunjukkan kerangka inklusif yang menerima keragaman sambil mendorong ketakwaan sebagai ukuran utama nilai daripada afiliasi nasional atau suku.

Ayat-ayat tersebut sering ditafsirkan untuk menunjukkan bahwa umat Muslim dapat bersatu secara spiritual melampaui perbedaan geografis. Ini menunjukkan bahwa keyakinan bersama lebih penting daripada kewarganegaraan (Césari, 2016; Naazer, 2018). Konsep ini memberikan dasar teologis yang kuat untuk menganggap Islam sebagai ideologi transnasional karena ajarannya secara inheren mengadvokasi komunitas global yang dipersatukan oleh iman daripada perbedaan teritorial atau etnis. Menurut Myers (2006), pendekatan universalistik ini sering menyebabkan perdebatan tentang apakah negara Islam secara definisi harus beroperasi pada skala internasional. Ini terutama berlaku karena konteks historis kekhalifahan sebagai organisasi politik dan agama yang bersatu.

Namun, masalah kontemporer, seperti pembagian dunia Muslim menjadi beberapa negara, mempersulit penerapan nyata "Ummah" di seluruh dunia. Misalnya, Yusuf al-Qaradawi berpendapat tentang negara Islam global yang didasarkan pada gagasan "Ummah", yang tidak terbatas pada batas etnis atau teritorial dan terbuka untuk semua orang yang beriman tanpa paksaan (RAHMAN, 2020). Semangat misionaris Islam yang terus-menerus, yang bertujuan untuk menyebarkan pesan Al-Qur'an secara universal, membedakan Islam dari agama

lain dengan dorongan kuat untuk ekspansi dunia (Braibanti, 1985). Universalitas yang kuat ini, yang berakar pada kitab suci Islam dan interpretasi sejarah, telah menyebabkan perdebatan akademis yang berkelanjutan tentang pengaruhnya terhadap struktur politik modern dan penciptaan identitas Islam transnasional (Feyyaz, 2013; Williams, 2007).

Debat Akademik dan Perspektifnya

Universalitas yang kuat ini, yang berakar kuat dalam kitab suci Islam dan interpretasi sejarah, telah menyebabkan perdebatan akademis yang berkelanjutan tentang pengaruhnya terhadap struktur politik modern dan pembentukan identitas Islam transnasional. Sarjana seperti Hallaq telah menggambarkan "Ummah" sebagai entitas yang melampaui batas nasional dan diatur oleh prinsip moral dan hukum. Perspektif ini menekankan perbedaan yang ada antara gagasan negara-bangsa modern dan gagasan Islam tradisional tentang komunitas yang beriman (Ahmad, 2010). Selain itu, definisi "Ummah" sebagai kelompok yang dibentuk oleh iman bersama daripada ikatan darah atau tanah, membedakannya dari komunitas lain dan memperkuat potensinya di luar batas negara (Al-Dakkak, 2019).

Akibatnya, diskusi sering kali berfokus pada bagaimana prinsip-prinsip universalistik "Ummah" ini dapat berinteraksi atau secara substansial menantang kedaulatan dan legitimasi negara-bangsa yang mapan, terutama di kalangan masyarakat Muslim (Naazer, 2018). Pasca-Khilafah, para teoritikus politik Muslim berdebat tentang posisi Islam dalam struktur negara-bangsa, dan modernitas menjadi referensi utama untuk kehidupan sosial dan keagamaan negara (Kaminski & Kaminski, 2025). Menurut Rahman (2020), perjuangan ini telah diinterpretasikan dalam berbagai cara, termasuk mendukung negara Islam di seluruh dunia dan menginterpretasikan ajaran Islam dalam konteks nasionalisme.

Namun, ada beberapa akademisi yang berpendapat bahwa kebanggaan dan identitas nasional, seperti afiliasi keluarga atau suku, adalah perasaan manusiawi yang diakomodasi oleh Islam, dan dapat digunakan untuk menyatukan orang menuju tujuan seperti pembentukan negara dan emansipasi nasional. Ini menantang gagasan bahwa universalisme secara inheren menghilangkan identitas nasional (Naazer,

2018). Namun, orang lain berpendapat bahwa universalisme Islam, yang dibentuk oleh konsep seperti "Ummah", secara alami menantang legitimasi model negara-bangsa dan mendukung komunitas non-teritorial yang lebih luas yang melampaui batas politik konvensional (Mohammed & Jureidini, 2022; Naazer, 2018).

Masa Depan Ideologi Transnasional Didunia Modern

Ideologi transnasional, termasuk agama, akan semakin memanfaatkan saluran-saluran ini untuk penyebaran dan mobilisasi karena perkembangan platform digital dan konektivitas global yang berkelanjutan (Krause, 2022). Ini akan menimbulkan tantangan baru bagi tata kelola dan kohesi sosial. Karena aktor non-negara sekarang dapat memiliki pengaruh yang signifikan secara global tanpa batasan geografis, pendekatan tradisional yang berpusat pada negara terhadap ideologi harus dievaluasi ulang. Menurut Mohiuddin (2024), praktik ekonomi yang dikaitkan dengan gerakan ini juga menekankan hubungan antara ideologi dan ekonomi politik, yang berdampak pada transformasi masyarakat dan membuka peluang dan pengaruh baru. Seringkali dipandang negatif, Islam transnasional memerlukan pendekatan teoretis yang seimbang terhadap integrasi imigran yang mempertimbangkan konteks transnasional dan nasional (Dikici, 2021). Metode ini mengakui bahwa aspek afiliasi dan identitas internasional dapat secara signifikan memengaruhi hasil integrasi dan menantang kerangka kebijakan domestik yang murni (Aguilar, 2018). Untuk membuat respons kebijakan yang memahami konteks dan menyeluruh, sangat penting untuk memahami bagaimana ideologi transnasional ini meresap dan mengubah komunitas lokal (Stephens et al., 2024).

Kesimpulan

Analisis diatas menunjukkan betapa rumit dan beragamnya ideologi Islam diluar batas nasional dan bagaimana hal itu berdampak besar pada stabilitas geopolitik, integrasi sosial, dan lanskap identitas global yang dinamis. Untuk membuat strategi yang efektif untuk menghadapi kompleksitas yang timbul dari ideologi-ideologi ini dan manifestasinya di dunia

yang semakin terhubung, pemahaman komprehensif ini sangat penting (Friedrichs, 2018). Ini menunjukkan bahwa pendekatan yang lebih halus sangat diperlukan, melampaui kategorisasi yang disederhanakan, dan melibatkan interpretasi yang beragam dan penggunaan politik ajaran Islam dalam berbagai konteks. Secara khusus, ini melibatkan pengakuan terhadap keragaman internal dalam pemikiran Islam tentang transnasionalisme, karena interpretasi teologis tertentu secara inheren mendukung universalisme melalui konsep seperti doktrin "ummah" (Sarhini & Effendi, 2020).

Konsep pan-Islamisme tentang populasi Muslim diseluruh dunia melampaui batas negara, mendorong kerangka ideologis internasional (Garofalo, 2006). Namun, doktrin ini tidak secara otomatis menjadi agenda politik yang konsisten, karena penerapan praktisnya berbeda-beda di antara kelompok dan wilayah (Krause, 2022). Memang, berbagai pihak, mulai dari pemimpin politik hingga kelompok ekstremis, sering menggunakan istilah "ummah" untuk mendorong dukungan atau mendukung tindakan yang sesuai dengan rasa solidaritas Muslim yang lebih luas. Namun, interpretasi dari istilah ini sangat berbeda (Porta, 2014). Seruan strategis ini menekankan bahwa ideologi agama sangat fleksibel dan dapat diubah dan digunakan untuk berbagai tujuan politik dan sosial (della Porta & Keating, 2008).

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